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 Minors, Parents, and Minor Parents 
Maya Manian * 
ABSTRACT 
As numerous scholars have noted, the law takes a strikingly incoherent 
approach to adolescent reproduction.  States overwhelmingly allow a teenage 
girl to independently consent to pregnancy care and medical treatment for 
her child, and even to give up her child for adoption, all without notice to her 
parents, but require parental notice or consent for abortion.  This Article 
argues that this oft-noted contradiction in the law on teenage reproductive 
decision making is in fact not as contradictory as it first appears.  A closer 
look at the law’s apparently conflicting approaches to teenage abortion and 
teenage childbirth exposes common ground that scholars have overlooked.  
This Article is the first to compare the full spectrum of minors’ reproductive 
rights and the first to unmask deep similarities in the law on adolescent re-
production – in particular an undercurrent of desire to punish (female) teen-
age sexuality, whether pregnant girls choose abortion or childbirth.  It 
demonstrates that in practice, the law undermines adolescents’ reproductive 
rights, whichever path of pregnancy resolution they choose.  At the same time 
that the law thwarts adolescents’ access to abortion care, it also fails to pro-
tect adolescents’ rights as parents.  The Article’s analysis shows that these 
two superficially conflicting sets of rules in fact work in tandem to enforce a 
traditional gender script – that self-sacrificing mothers should give birth and 
give up their infants to better circumstances, no matter the emotional costs to 
themselves.  This Article also suggests novel policy solutions to the difficul-
ties posed by adolescent reproduction by urging reforms that look to third 
parties other than parents or the State to better support adolescent decision 
making relating to pregnancy and parenting. 
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Scholars and Teachers Conference; and University of San Francisco School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship Workshop.  Special thanks to Katherine Franke, Suzanne Gold-
berg, and the Center for Gender and Sexuality Law at Columbia Law School for 
providing an engaging and inspiring community while drafting this Article.  Thanks 
to Amy Wright for her always outstanding services as Research Librarian.  Thanks to 
Mairead Donohey, Masha Litvinov, and Karen Majovski for excellent research assis-
tance, and thanks to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for thoughtful editorial 
suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When does childhood end?  The answer to this question determines the 
legal rights of youth in all arenas of life.1  Yet, as many scholars have noted, 
the law lacks a coherent approach to defining the end of childhood, the be-
ginning of adulthood, or a space in between.2  Those categorized as children 
for most purposes can be criminally liable as adults.3  Those categorized as 
adults for most purposes cannot legally purchase alcohol.4  Those who many 
view as falling in between the categories of child or adult – adolescents – are 
invisible under the law.5 
The law’s incoherent approach to adolescent sexuality and reproduction 
is especially striking.  For example, in states with parental notice or consent 
mandates, which represent the vast majority of states, teenage girls facing an 
unplanned pregnancy must obtain permission from a parent or, alternatively, 
from a judge to receive abortion care.6  In contrast, states typically exempt 
other similarly sensitive medical care from parental involvement, especially 
medical care related to sexual activity.7  All states allow minors to obtain 
 
 1. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 547, 547–48 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence] 
(“[T]he answer to the question, ‘When does childhood end?’ is different in different 
policy contexts.  This variation makes it difficult to discern a coherent image of legal 
childhood.  Youths who are in elementary school may be deemed adults for purposes 
of assigning criminal responsibility and punishment, while seniors in high school 
cannot vote and most college students are legally prohibited from drinking.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Compre-
hensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 354–55 (2006). 
 3. Id. at 315. 
 4. Id. at 297–98. 
 5. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 556 (footnote 
omitted) (“Although lawmakers have occasionally recognized the distinctive charac-
ter of adolescence, more typically this transitional stage is invisible, and adolescents 
are incorporated into the binary legal categories of childhood or adulthood.”); Rachel 
Rebouché, Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance, 34 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 175, 206–07 (2011) (noting the invisibility of adolescence in the law).  In 
this Article, I use the term “minor” to refer to persons under the age of eighteen.  In 
this Article, I use the terms “minors,” “children,” “juveniles,” and “youth” inter-
changeably to generally refer to persons under the age of eighteen.  I use the terms 
“adolescent” or “teenager” to refer to persons approximately between the ages of 
thirteen and eighteen.  See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging 
a Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-making 
and Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927, 929 n.2 (2006) (discussing age-based 
differentiation in legal rules and noting important developmental differences between 
pre-adolescents and adolescents). 
 6. See Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 572 & 
n.98. 
 7. See id. at 567–68. 
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treatment for sexually transmitted infections without notifying their parents, 
and many states allow minors to receive prescription contraceptives without 
involving a parent.8  States also overwhelmingly allow a teenage girl to inde-
pendently consent to pregnancy care and medical treatment for her child, and 
even to give up her child for adoption, all without notice to her parents.9  Yet, 
these same states mandate parental notice or consent for abortion.10  If teen-
agers are too immature to make the decision to obtain an abortion without 
parental or judicial supervision, how can states conclude that those same 
teenagers are mature enough to decide to continue a pregnancy and raise a 
child, or to relinquish the child for adoption, all without the guidance of an 
adult? 
This Article argues that this oft-noted contradiction in the law on ado-
lescent reproduction is in fact not as contradictory as it first appears.  A closer 
look at the law’s apparently conflicting approaches to teenage reproductive 
decision making reveals common ground that scholars have overlooked.  This 
Article is the first to compare the full spectrum of minors’ reproductive rights 
and the first to unmask deep similarities in the law on adolescent reproduc-
tion.  Using a wider lens to assess minors’ reproductive rights, this Article 
compares the law on minors’ rights to obtain abortion care with minors’ pa-
rental rights.  Through this wider lens, this Article reveals that in practice, the 
result has been not so much that the two areas of law conflict, but instead, 
that in reality, the law undermines adolescents’ rights, whichever path of 
pregnancy resolution they choose.  At the same time that the law thwarts 
teenage girls’ access to abortion care, it also fails to protect their rights as 
parents. 
A more expansive inquiry into adolescents’ reproductive rights demon-
strates that the conflicting doctrines in practice work in tandem to enforce a 
traditional gender script: namely, self-sacrificing mothers should give birth 
and give up their children to better circumstances than teenage parenting pre-
sumably provides, regardless of the emotional pain these young mothers 
might suffer as a result of relinquishment.  The notion that the law should 
mete out punishment onto sexually irresponsible women, such as by denying 
access to abortion or removing their children, has a long history.11  The im-
 
 8. See id.; Cunningham, supra note 2, at 354. 
 9. See Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 567–68. 
 10. See Jennifer Durcan & Annette R. Appell, Minor Birth Mothers and Consent 
to Adoption: An Anomaly in Youth Law, 5 ADOPTION Q. 69 (2001); Walter Wadling-
ton, Medical Decision Making For and By Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, 
and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 323–24 (1994). 
 11. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 255, 323–25 (2011) (describing gender scripts revealed by case law on 
reproduction and regret); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Untying the Moral Knot of Abortion, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299, 1308-10 (2014) (discussing theme of punishing wom-
en’s sexual irresponsibility in abortion restrictions); Carol Sanger, Separating from 
Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377 (1996) [hereinafter Sanger, Separating from 
Children] (describing idealized notions of maternal sacrifice, in particular that moth-
4
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pact of the law’s punishment falls most harshly on adolescents from poor and 
struggling families, as these youth have the fewest resources to obtain either 
judicial bypass for an abortion or support for making parenting decisions. 
While a superficial review of the law on adolescent reproduction sug-
gests conflict and incoherence, a closer look at the reality of minor parents’ 
parental rights unmasks a perverse coherence to the law.  The conflicting 
doctrines on abortion and childbirth obscure how both abortion law and the 
law dealing with minors as parents take highly skeptical views of adoles-
cents’ rights to make reproductive decisions and mask how these laws serve 
as a means to enforce traditional gender norms.  This Article uses family law 
doctrines and practices as a lens to shed light on the law’s seemingly contra-
dictory approaches to teenage sexuality, pregnancy, parenting, and abortion.  
Family law’s prism helps to explain these conflicts in novel ways.  This Arti-
cle argues that the surface incoherence in the law regulating adolescent sexu-
ality and reproduction stems, in part, from traditional rules governing parental 
rights.  Current law in this context, although appearing to have made progress 
for adolescent rights, in fact maps onto conventional rules about parents’ 
rights to control their children’s upbringing and the narrow exemptions to 
those rules. 
For example, the rule that adolescents can freely consent to medical 
treatment for sexually transmitted infections represents an application of the 
traditional exemption from parental control for medical emergencies, rather 
than a recognition of adolescents’ right to sexual or health care autonomy.  
Similarly, this Article argues that the law grants minor parents full parental 
autonomy, at least in theory, because of a reflexive desire to assert the rights 
of persons categorized as parents – not out of respect for a minor’s right to be 
a parent.  In other words, the law resists any overt reduction of parental 
rights, including for minor parents, out of fear that explicitly undermining 
even minors’ parental rights would also threaten the authority and certainty of 
the traditional parental rights model reserved for most adults.12 
Yet, while paying lip service to the parental rights of minors in theory, 
the law fails to support adolescent parenting in substance.  We can see this 
through a deeper examination of the areas of family law that deal directly 
with minors as parents: child welfare law and adoption law.  Closer study of 
child welfare and adoption practices reveals that the rigid notions about pa-
rental rights that inform the law’s superficial grant of autonomy to teenage 
parents do not carry through to substantively protect minor parents’ abilities 
to parent their children.  In some contexts, as in adoption law’s right to relin-
quish, the law’s grant of adult-like parental “rights” to minors may actually 
serve to undermine minors’ parental interests by making it easier to remove 
 
ers who fail to separate when conditions call for it are regarded as “misguided, selfish, 
unnatural”). 
 12. Although, in theory, adult parents’ rights to custody and control of their chil-
dren receive full constitutional protection, the parental rights of marginalized groups – 
particularly poor racial minorities – have long been threatened by state scrutiny under 
the child welfare system.  See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing child welfare law). 
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infants from their care.  Minor mothers especially face the worst of both 
worlds – the lack of governmental support endured by adult parents and the 
intensive oversight generally enforced upon minors. 
The last part of this Article takes a prescriptive turn.  It suggests that we 
could better support adolescents’ decisions about pregnancy and parenting by 
turning to third party adults other than parents or state agents – such as judges 
and child welfare officials – who wield heavy-handed authority over minors.  
Depending on the context, third parties who might serve as beneficial re-
sources for pregnant or parenting minors include extended family members, 
neighbors, and community members; health care professionals; and lawyers 
acting on behalf of the minor. 
Abortion law, child welfare law, and adoption law all purport to serve 
two primary goals: to ensure sound decision making for pregnant or parenting 
adolescents and to protect the well being of children.  Yet, in practice, the law 
too often fails to achieve these goals.  Parents may be unsupportive or una-
vailable to adolescents, and state agents may be motivated by biases and con-
cerns that conflict with pregnant or parenting minors’ own interests.  Alt-
hough some adolescents can make sound reproductive decisions without be-
ing required to consult with an adult, political resistance to increased adoles-
cent autonomy – particularly around sexuality and reproduction – remains 
formidable.  Furthermore, scientific research on adolescence suggests that 
some adolescents would benefit from adult guidance when faced with diffi-
cult, consequential decisions.  Therefore, law makers should consider more 
effective policy solutions beyond the parent/state binary to achieve the stated 
aims of securing sound reproductive decision making and protecting the well 
being of both pregnant adolescents and their infants.  The final section of this 
Article considers potential policy reforms incorporating third parties and urg-
es further conversation in this direction. 
The analysis proceeds as follows.  Part I grounds the discussion by 
providing a brief overview of the legal history of parental rights over chil-
dren, primarily focusing on constitutional decisions on privacy rights within 
the family.  These decisions set forth the parameters balancing parents’ rights, 
children’s rights, and the State’s interest in protecting children that guide the 
laws governing adolescent autonomy.  Part I then describes the law’s incon-
sistent approach to whether and when it grants adolescents’ autonomy in sex-
ual and reproductive decision making, particularly with regard to teenage 
abortion versus childbirth. 
Part II applies longstanding conventions on the scope of parental rights 
to help explain the inconsistencies in the law governing teenagers’ sexual and 
reproductive autonomy and unmasks the traditional gender scripts animating 
the law.  Part II demonstrates the stronghold that traditional conceptions of 
parental control continue to exert, even in areas of the law that appear to ex-
pand adolescent autonomy.  This Part also examines the treatment of minor 
parents in the child welfare system and in adoption law to demonstrate that 
the law in practice undermines minor parents’ parental rights, both for mar-
ginalized adolescents and for some youth from less marginalized groups.  
6
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Strikingly, in their operation, the conflicting legal rules on adolescent abor-
tion and parenting serve a similar end – the law acts as a means to punish 
female adolescent sexual transgression of purity norms. 
Part III argues that interventions that look to third party adults may help 
to create space for adolescence in the law by addressing the absence of sup-
portive parents and providing alternatives to overly restrictive state interven-
tions that undermine minors’ reproductive decision making.  Although pri-
vate family law doctrine has increasingly recognized the important role that 
adults other than parents play in children’s lives, third parties have not been 
incorporated consistently or effectively in the law of adolescent abortion or 
adolescent parenting. Part III explores several possibilities for regulatory 
reform and generally urges a conversation about how the law could 
acknowledge the unique needs of adolescents by providing options between 
the extremes of autonomy and authority of parent or state. 
I.  PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE STATE: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
BALANCING ACT 
The conventional framing of the family within U.S. law “embrace[s] the 
image of a triangle to describe the allocation of legal authority over childrear-
ing” with parents, children, and the State standing at each point of the trian-
gle.13  Balancing the interests of child, parent, and State has been an ongoing 
struggle at the federal and state levels across various family law issues.  At 
times, the law portrays parents’ and children’s liberty interests as aligned 
against encroachment by the State.  At other times, the law treats parents’ and 
children’s rights as in conflict, and the State acts as arbiter between the two.14  
In this Part, this Article grounds the discussion that follows by providing the 
legal context for rules governing parents, minors, and minor parents.  First, 
this Article briefly summarizes the law on parental rights and children’s 
rights, focusing primarily on constitutional decisions protecting privacy with-
in the family.  Next, this Article provides an overview of state law governing 
minors’ sexual and reproductive decision making to demonstrate the law’s 
inconsistent doctrinal approaches to granting minors autonomy. 
A.  Privacy and Parents’ Rights 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that children possess con-
stitutional rights, minors’ rights have long been curtailed based on the state’s 
interest in protecting vulnerable and immature minors and the state’s defer-
ence to parents’ constitutional right to control their children’s upbringing.  
 
 13. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 
833 (2007) (“Family Law in the United States has long embraced the image of a tri-
angle to describe the allocation of legal authority over childrearing.  Parents, children, 
and the state stand at the three points of this triangle.”). 
 14. See id. 
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The Court long ago established that parents possess a fundamental right to 
raise their children as they see fit.  In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court 
struck down a state law forbidding education in a language other than English 
on the ground that due process protects parents’ rights to “establish a home 
and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.”15  Two 
years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and 
Mary, the Court found that an Oregon law prohibiting parochial school edu-
cation “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”16  Over 
the years, the Court has repeatedly upheld parents’ fundamental right of au-
thority over their children, stating that “it is cardinal with us that the custody, 
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary func-
tion and freedom include preparation for obligations that the state can neither 
supply nor hinder.”17 
Most recently, in Troxel v. Granville, the Court reaffirmed the extensive 
line of precedent granting parents the fundamental right to raise their children 
without interference from the government, although in a notably circum-
scribed manner.18  In Troxel, Justice O’Connor’s controlling plurality opinion 
held that courts must give “special weight” to a fit parent’s determination of 
her child’s best interests, but otherwise established no broad rule limiting 
third party, non-parent visitation laws.19  Although Troxel granted a sliver of 
deference to parental rights, the plurality also acknowledged the “changing 
realities of the American family” and confirmed the important role that third 
parties play in today’s pluralistic families: “The demographic changes of the 
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. . . .  
[P]ersons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequen-
cy to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing.”20   Minority communities 
in particular rely heavily on parental surrogates in childrearing, as a number 
 
 15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923). 
 16. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 17. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).  See also Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civi-
lization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor 
children. . . .  The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents 
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required 
for making life’s difficult decisions.  More important, historically it has recognized 
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their chil-
dren.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (upholding Amish parents’ 
right to remove children from school). 
 18. 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
 19. Id. at 58.  The various opinions in Troxel “scrupulously avoid[ed] any strong 
endorsement of parental rights.”  Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 
639 (2002) [hereinafter Buss, “Parental” Rights].  The decision, therefore, has had 
limited practical impact and “induced no startling or radical changes with respect to 
third-party visitation.”  See John Dewitt Gregory, The Detritus of Troxel, 40 FAM. 
L.Q. 133, 144 (2006). 
 20. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63–64. 
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of scholars have discussed.21  Numerous cases post-Troxel permit nonparents 
to exercise “custodial fragments” – most importantly visitation rights – which 
represent a significant intrusion upon parental control over their child’s up-
bringing.22 
Troxel noted that a parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care 
of his or her children has never been unlimited.23  The Court has consistently 
balanced parents’ rights against the state’s independent interest in protecting 
the welfare of its youth.  The state’s parens patriae power gives it leeway to 
limit parental authority if the State has sufficient justification to conclude that 
a parental decision would be harmful to the child’s health and development. 24  
For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld the application of 
child labor laws to a nine-year-old girl who was soliciting for the Jehovah’s 
Witness religion at her parents’ direction.25  The Court emphasized that the 
state possesses the authority to “guard the general interest in youth’s well 
being” and, therefore, can “restrict the parent’s control by requiring school 
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other 
ways.”26 
The state’s power to circumscribe parents’ constitutional right to custo-
dy and control over their child’s upbringing has particularly been reinforced 
in cases where a parent’s decision making may place the child’s health in 
jeopardy.  Numerous cases have upheld the state’s power to limit a parent’s 
decision-making authority where such authority presents a significant risk of 
harm to a child’s health.27  The important governmental interest in protecting 
 
 21. See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
47, 57–63 (2007); Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know 
Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 865, 869–72 (2003). 
 22. Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 19, at 635–36 (criticizing Troxel’s ap-
proach); KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING CHANGE: QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES, AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 115–16 (2009) (discussing post-
Troxel cases granting third parties rights to continue their relationship with a child 
against a biological parent’s wishes). 
 23. RICHMAN, supra note 22, at 87. 
 24. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968); Pierce v. Soc’y of the 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 25. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–70 (1944). 
 26. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted). 
 27. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 471 (1990) (“[W]here parental in-
volvement threatens to harm the child, the parent’s authority must yield.”).  See also 
In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 654 (1970 N.Y. Fam. Ct.) (“[The] court’s authority 
to deal with the abused, neglected or physically handicapped child is not limited to 
‘drastic situations’ or to those which constitute a ‘present emergency’, but that the 
Court has a ‘wide discretion’ to order medical or surgical care and treatment for an 
infant even over parental objection, if in the Court’s judgment the health, safety or 
welfare of the child requires it.”).  See B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by 
and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. 
& POL’Y 37, 41–43 (2012) (discussing minors’ ability to consent to medical health 
9
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children’s health plays a large role in the debates on adolescents’ abilities to 
access sensitive medical treatment, particularly related to sexuality and repro-
duction. 
B.  Privacy and Adolescents’ Rights 
In the context of sexual and reproductive decision making, the Court has 
struggled to find a way to balance the respective interests of child, parent, and 
state.  Following the Court’s decisions upholding adults’ right to access con-
traceptives, in Carey v. Population Services International, the Court declared 
unconstitutional laws restricting minors’ access to contraception.28  Carey 
acknowledged that the question of the state’s power to regulate constitution-
ally protected conduct when engaged in by minors “is a vexing one, perhaps 
not susceptible of precise answer,”29 but nevertheless, the Court struck down 
a state law prohibiting distribution of contraception to those under sixteen.30  
Carey found that the State’s desire to deter minors’ sexual activity “by in-
creasing the hazards attendant on it” was insufficient justification to infringe 
upon a minor’s constitutional rights.31 
With respect to abortion, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bellotti 
v. Baird (Bellotti II) in 1979,32 laws requiring parental involvement in minor 
 
care); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of 
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
251, 262 (2005) (noting that parents have both the right to consent to their children’s 
healthcare and the responsibility to seek medical care for their children).  States often 
intervene when parents deny children medical treatment based on religious beliefs, 
since “the State’s interest in the safety and well-being of minors may compel medical 
treatment for a child despite objections by the parents that are based upon their reli-
gious beliefs.”  Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1985), vacated, 510 A.2d 562 (Md. 1986). 
 28. 431 U.S. 678, 678 (1977). 
 29. Id. at 692. 
 30. Id. at 681–82. 
 31. Id. at 694.  See also B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 
64 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1307–08 (2015) (analyzing various opinions of the justices in the 
Carey decision). 
 32. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).  See 
also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (holding 
unconstitutional New Hampshire law barring minor from obtaining abortion care 
without parental notice even in medical emergencies); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 
292 (1997) (judicial bypass provision allowing waiver of notice requirement if notifi-
cation was not in minor’s best interest was sufficient to protect minor’s right to abor-
tion under a Montana statute); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) (holding parental consent provision of the Pennsylvania abortion statute does 
not impose an undue burden); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (holding 
that a Minnesota statute requiring both parents be notified when a minor attempts to 
get an abortion was unconstitutional, but upholding the allowance of a judicial bypass 
for the requirement of parental notice); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 
10
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abortion decisions have been constitutional, provided that the laws offer judi-
cial bypass as an alternative to parental involvement.33  Bellotti II found that 
minors’ right to access abortion could be restricted for three reasons: “[T]he 
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in 
an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child 
rearing.”34  The Bellotti II Court held that parental consent laws with an ex-
peditious and confidential judicial bypass alternative appropriately balance 
the minor’s constitutional right to access abortion with both the parental right 
to control their child’s upbringing and the state’s interest in protecting vul-
nerable and immature minors.35  Importantly, Bellotti II made clear that par-
ents could not exercise a veto over a minor’s decision to obtain an abortion; 
rather, parental or judicial involvement served to ensure better decision mak-
ing because “immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed 
choices.”36 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which reassessed and ultimately up-
held aspects of the core right to access abortion established in Roe v. Wade, 
the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of parental consent laws so long as 
those laws provided for judicial bypass.37  Judges in bypass hearings have the 
authority to either grant consent for a minor’s abortion care or to block access 
 
497 U.S. 502 (1990) (holding Ohio statute requiring parental notice be given by phy-
sician performing abortion constitutional); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) 
(upholding a Utah statute requiring physician to notify the parents of a minor seeking 
an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (hold-
ing a blanket parental consent requirement for minors is unconstitutional). 
 33. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (plurality opinion); Amanda Dennis et al., The Im-
pact of Laws Requiring Parental Involvement for Abortion: A Literature Review, 
GUTTMACHER INST. 3 (Mar. 2009), www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ParentalInvolvement
Laws.pdf. 
 34. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634 (plurality opinion). 
 35. Id.  See also Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Deci-
sion Making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75 
(1995) (providing judicial framework for Michigan judges deciding whether a minor 
girl may have an abortion without the consent of a parent under the Michigan Parental 
Rights Restoration Act). 
 36. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640 (plurality opinion).  Bellotti II emphasized that no 
third party could veto a mature minor’s abortion decision; therefore, a minor whose 
parent denied consent could then seek permission from a judge.  Id. at 649.  Further-
more, a judge could not substitute his or her own judgment if the minor was found to 
be sufficiently mature to make an informed decision.  See id. at 643–50. 
 37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899.  See also Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320 (reaffirming that 
parental involvement laws must also have a health exception for medical emergen-
cies).  The Court has made it clear that parental consent laws must have a judicial 
bypass option, but it remains unclear whether parental notification laws for uneman-
cipated minors constitutionally require judicial bypass procedures.  See Erin Helling 
& Jenny Nam, Eleventh Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: Health Care 
Law Chapter: Abortion, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 341, 351 (2010). 
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to abortion care without parental involvement.38  As discussed in the next 
Part, these requirements in the abortion context stand in contrast to the rela-
tively greater autonomy granted to minors seeking medical care for sexual 
health, pregnancy, and childbirth. 
C.  Conflicts in the Law on Adolescent Sexuality and Reproduction 
Over the past several decades, states have greatly expanded minors’ au-
thority to consent to health care without involving their parents.  Although 
minors generally must obtain parental consent prior to receiving medical 
treatment, states have permitted adolescents to more freely obtain treatment 
for sensitive medical care related to drug addiction, mental health, and sexu-
ality.39  The landscape of the law governing teenagers’ autonomy in sexual 
and reproductive decision making is quite varied across the states and is often 
contradictory in its approach.  This Part describes those inconsistencies across 
a wide range of activities related to adolescent sexuality and reproduction. 
One useful way to divide up these issues is by assessing “pre-sexual ac-
tivity” decisions versus “post-sexual activity” decisions, since that dividing 
line explains controversies over approaches to adolescent autonomy.  Grant-
ing adolescents autonomy over their “pre-sexual activity” decisions – for 
instance, providing information or services that may help a minor who is con-
sidering engaging in sex, such as access to comprehensive sexual education 
and contraception – has been much more controversial.  There continues to be 
controversy about whether teenagers should be permitted to avail themselves 
of comprehensive sex education and contraceptives without parental notice or 
consent.40  In contrast, allowing teenagers to have greater decision-making 
autonomy with regard to “post-sexual activity” decisions, including treatment 
related to the consequences of having sex, such as medical care for sexually 
transmitted infections (“STIs”), pregnancy, and childbirth, has been much 
less controversial, with the exception of abortion.41  Almost all states permit 
teens to make STI and pregnancy treatment decisions without parental in-
volvement.42  An overview of the law in this context shows the states’ incon-
 
 38. See generally Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 35 (describing judicial bypass 
hearings in Michigan and in comparison with other states). 
 39. See Wadlington, supra note 10, at 323–24. 
 40. State Policies in Brief: Sex and HIV Education, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 3 
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SE.pdf. 
 41. See State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to STI Services, GUTTMACHER 
INST. 1, 2 (Jan. 1, 2016), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MASS.pdf; State Policies in Brief: 
Minors’ Rights as Parents, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 1 (Jan. 1, 2016), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MRP.pdf. 
 42. See State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to STI Services, supra note 41, at 
2; State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Prenatal Care, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 2 
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MAPC.pdf. 
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sistent approaches to granting adolescents autonomy over their sexual and 
reproductive decision making. 
1.  Sex Education 
Whether teenagers should possess the ability to access comprehensive 
sex education and prescription contraceptives without parental involvement 
remains controversial, largely on the basis that these “pre-sexual activity” 
decisions fall within the scope of parents’ right to control their children’s 
upbringing.43  With respect to sex education, some parents’ rights groups 
have argued that parents should determine whether their child should receive 
any sex education, abstinence-only education, or more comprehensive sex 
education.44  Youth advocates, in contrast, assert that minors engage in sexual 
activity whether their parents consent or not, so the state has an obligation to 
accurately and comprehensively educate minors on sexual health.45 
It is up to the states whether they choose to mandate sex education or 
leave it up to localities to provide as they see fit.46  Only twenty states and the 
District of Columbia mandate sex education and HIV education.47  Thirteen 
states mandate HIV education only.48  Like the decision to provide sex educa-
tion, it is similarly up to the states to mandate the scope of the content of the 
education or to leave it up to the localities.49  Although recent studies have 
concluded that abstinence-only education is ineffective, the debate over sex 
education has led to a number of specific content requirements in favor of 
it.50  Regardless of the state or local mandates regarding the provision of sex 
education, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia allow parents to opt 
their children out of sex education or HIV education.51  Thus, in the majority 
 
 43. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, The Failure of Abstinence-Only Edu-
cation: Minors Have a Right to Honest Talk About Sex, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
12, 49–50 (2006). 
 44. See, e.g., NYC PARENTS’ CHOICE COALITION, 
http://www.nycparentschoice.org/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2016). 
 45. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 61–62; Cynthia Dailard, Legislating 
Against Arousal: The Growing Divide Between Federal Policy and Teenage Sexual 
Behavior, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12 (2006). 
 46. See State Policies in Brief: Sex and HIV Education, supra note 40, at 3. 
 47. Id. (Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia). 
 48. Id. (Alabama, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
 49. See id. 
 50. CHRISTOPHER TRENHOLM ET AL., MATHEMATICA POL’Y RESEARCH, INC. 
IMPACTS OF FOUR TITLE V, SECTION 510 ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 51, 59 
(Apr. 2007), http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/~/media/publications/PDFs/impactabstinence.pdf. 
 51. State Policies in Brief: Sex and HIV Education, supra note 40, at 3 (Ala-
bama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
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of states, parents may exercise a complete veto power over their teenagers’ 
access to sex education.52 
2.  Contraception 
The Supreme Court has extended the constitutional right to access con-
traception to minors,53 and many states have expressly allowed minors to 
consent to prescription contraceptive services without parental involvement. 
54  Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia explicitly allow all minors 
to consent to prescription contraceptive services.55  Twenty-five states explic-
itly permit minors to consent to prescription contraception if they meet cer-
tain requirements, such as being married, being a parent, having been preg-
nant before, or having a special health need.56  The remaining four states have 
no explicit law on a minor’s ability to obtain contraceptive services, but even 
where a state has no relevant law, physicians may commonly provide medical 
care to a mature minor without parental consent as a matter of practice.57 
The policy debate surrounding adolescent access to contraception rages 
on today.58  Those in favor of unfettered access to contraception argue that 
 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 697–99 (1977). 
 54. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, 
GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 2 (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_MACS.pdf. 
 55. Id. at 2 (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming). 
 56. Id.  Twenty-one states allow married minors to consent to contraceptive 
services.  Id.  Three states allow minors to consent to contraception upon advice from 
a physician to prevent physical hazard.  Id.  Six states allow minors with children to 
consent to contraception.  Id.  Six states allow minors who are or have been pregnant 
to consent to contraception.  Id.  Eleven states allow minors to consent that meet cer-
tain other eligibility requirements.  Id.  Four states have no explicit policy on the 
matter.  Id. 
 57. Id.  No state or federal laws require minors to get parental permission to 
access contraception, although some proposals to require parental permission have 
surfaced.  See Parental Consent and Notice for Contraceptives Threatens Teen Health 
and Constitutional Rights, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.
reproductiverights.org/document/parental-consent-and-notice-for-contraceptives-
threatens-teen-health-and-constitutional-rig. 
 58. For example, the FDA’s politically charged decision to limit adolescent ac-
cess to emergency contraception led to a federal lawsuit – although emergency con-
traception blurs the pre-sex/post-sex dividing line it has been debated about similarly 
to traditional contraception regarding its use by teenagers, i.e., whether it will encour-
14
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adolescents will engage in sexual activity with or without parental consent.59  
Many minors wish to protect themselves from unwanted pregnancy, but they 
will not discuss their sexual activities with their parents in order to do so.60  
Accordingly, youth advocates emphasize that allowing sexually active teens 
to obtain contraceptive services without parental involvement protects ado-
lescent health and development.61   Those opposed to granting teenagers 
greater autonomy in accessing contraception argue that giving a minor the 
right to consent to contraceptive services without parents’ knowledge under-
mines parental authority and risks the minor’s healthy development.62 
The debate on adolescent access to comprehensive sex education and 
contraceptives seems unlikely to subside in the near future.  In contrast, mi-
nors’ unobstructed access to “post-sexual activity” medical treatments, with 
the exception of abortion, remains largely uncontroversial. 
 
age teenagers to engage in sex.  See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the FDA could not mandate point-of-sale restrictions 
on emergency contraception); Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544–45 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the FDA’s decision to limit minors’ access to Plan B 
contraception was an abuse of discretion).  In 2013, the FDA approved emergency 
contraception for use without a prescription and without age restriction for all women 
of child-bearing potential.  See FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency Contra-
ceptive for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing Potential, 
FDA (June 20, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm358082.htm. 
 59. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, supra note 
54, at 1. 
 60. Joshua A. Douglas, When is a “Minor” Also an “Adult”?: An Adolescent’s 
Liberty Interest in Accessing Contraceptives from Public School Distribution Pro-
grams, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 545, 551 (2007). 
 61. Id. (footnotes omitted) (“Studies suggest that if a state requires prior parental 
approval before a minor may obtain contraceptives from a distribution program, many 
teenagers will forego availing themselves of this service.  In one survey, 70% of teen-
agers said that if the law required parental notification, they would not visit a health 
clinic at all, and 20% stated that they would continue to have sex but would either 
rely on the withdrawal method or not use any contraceptives.  Only 1% of those sur-
veyed who currently use sexual health services said that they would stop having sex if 
parental involvement was mandated before the adolescents received contraceptives.”).  
See also Rachel K. Jones & Heather Boonstra, Confidential Reproductive Health 
Services for Minors: The Potential Impact of Mandated Parental Involvement for 
Contraception, 36 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 182, 189 (2004) (explain-
ing that mandated parental involvement threatens the right of minors to access repro-
ductive health care). 
 62. Jones & Boonstra, supra note 61, at 182; Anna Pikovsky Krishtul, Comment, 
The FDA’s Recent About-Face: Plan B Age Restriction is Unlawful Rulemaking and 
Violates Minors’ Due Process Rights, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 325 (2008) (arguing to 
the contrary that restricting minors’ access to contraception results in a higher degree 
of harm to minor’s health). 
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3.  STI Treatment 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia explicitly allow minors to 
consent to treatment for STIs.63  A few states have special requirements if the 
minor is HIV positive, and some states have age prerequisites for consent, 
such as a minimum age of twelve.64  Aside from these requirements, howev-
er, legislators uniformly agree that the law should not mandate parental notice 
or consent prior to a minor receiving STI services.65  Although some states 
allow a physician to inform a minor’s parents that she is receiving STI treat-
ment, no state mandates parental notification.66 
The policy behind this rule is undisputed.  Physicians and public health 
advocates emphasize that hindering a minor’s consent to STI treatment can 
increase the spread of STIs among adolescents, because minors are likely to 
conceal the presence of STI symptoms from their parents for fear of a nega-
tive reaction.67  Accordingly, minors must be able to seek treatment on their 
own in order to promote broader adolescent sexual health.68  Couched in the 
language of public health, this exception to the general rule requiring parental 
involvement with a minor’s treatment decisions has generated little to no 
controversy.69 
4.  Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Medical Care for Minors’ Children 
In sharp contrast to most states’ requirements of parental involvement in 
abortion decisions, states overwhelmingly grant minors the right to inde-
pendently make decisions related to their pregnancy and to their children’s 
medical care if they choose to carry a pregnancy to term.70  Thirty-six states 
and the District of Columbia explicitly allow minors to consent to prenatal 
 
 63. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to STI Services, supra note 41, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 1–2.  Eleven states have age prerequisites for consent.  Id.  Eight-
een states permit, but do not require, physicians to inform a minor’s parents that he or 
she is seeking or obtaining STI services.  Id.  One state requires parental notification 
in the case of a positive HIV test.  Id.  One state requires a physician to report a posi-
tive STI test result for a minor younger than twelve.  Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern 
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 48 (1994) [hereinafter Ober-
man, Turning Girls Into Women]. 
 68. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 354–55. 
 69. Similarly, statutes permitting minors to consent to substance abuse treatment 
are viewed not as an endorsement of minor capacity, but as an extension of the tradi-
tional rule that a doctor may treat a child without parental permission in medical 
emergencies because the law presumes that parents would consent to protect their 
child’s health.  See Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women, supra note 67, at 48; infra 
Part II (discussing treatment-based exceptions to parental consent). 
 70. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Prenatal Care, supra note 42, at 2. 
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care.71  Thirteen states have no explicit law on minors’ prenatal care, and 
thus, minors commonly receive such care without parental involvement.72  
North Dakota is the only state that requires parental consent prior to a minor 
receiving prenatal care.73 
The majority of states also respect a minor’s right as a parent to make 
treatment decisions on behalf of her child.74  Thirty states and the District of 
Columbia allow minors to consent to medical care for their children; the re-
maining twenty states have no explicit law on the matter.75 
In sum, the vast majority of states have made the legislative policy deci-
sion that the health of a pregnant adolescent outweighs parents’ rights to be 
involved in their adolescent’s important treatment decisions.  Accordingly, 
states permit minors to have autonomous access to care for pregnancy and 
childbirth and even give them the power to make major decisions that may 
arise during treatment, such as when and whether to consent to a C-section.76  
Much like a minor’s access to STI treatment, some policymakers couch the 
rationale for a minor’s unhindered access to prenatal care in the language of 
public health.77  Less clear is the rationale for allowing minor parents to make 
medical treatment decisions for their children, which is discussed further in 
Part II.A. 
5.  Adoption 
As with granting minor parents the right to consent to medical care for 
their children, the majority of states treat minors like adults when it comes to 
the decision to relinquish their child for adoption.78  Forty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia allow minors to relinquish their infants for adoption, either 
 
 71. Id. at 2.  Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia allow all minors to 
consent to prenatal care.  Id.  Four states require the minor to be of a minimum age 
before she can consent to care.  Id.  Four states allow a “mature minor” to consent to 
prenatal care.  Id. 
 72. Id. (Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).  “In states that 
lack relevant policy or case law, physicians may commonly provide medical care to a 
mature minor without parental consent, particularly if the state allows minors to con-
sent to related health services.”  Id. at 1. 
 73. Id. at 2.  North Dakota requires parental consent during prenatal visits in the 
second and third trimesters; the minor may consent to prenatal care during the first 
trimester and for the first visit after the first trimester.  Id.  See also N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 14-10-19 (West 2016). 
 74. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Rights as Parents, supra note 41, at 2. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Melissa Prober, Note, Please Don’t Tell My Parents: The Validity of School 
Policies Mandating Parental Notification of a Student’s Pregnancy, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 557, 569–70 (2005). 
 77. See State Policies in Brief: Minors Access to Prenatal Care, supra note 42, 
at 2. 
 78. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Rights as Parents, supra note 41, at 2. 
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explicitly by statute or by making no distinction between minor parents and 
adult parents.79  Five states require minors to be represented by legal counsel 
in adoption hearings but have no requirement for involving the minor’s par-
ents.80  Of the remaining five states, only four require parental consent to 
adoption of their minor’s infant,81 and one state requires parental notifica-
tion.82 
As discussed previously, a minor’s autonomy with respect to sexuality 
and reproductive decisions relates, at least to some degree, to public health 
concerns.  In sharp contrast, a minor’s freedom to give up her child for adop-
tion without parental involvement is difficult to justify as a matter of public 
health.  This Article explores the likely motivations for the striking level of 
autonomy granted to minors relinquishing an infant for adoption in Part II.B. 
6.  Abortion Exceptionalism 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bellotti II, laws requiring paren-
tal involvement in minor abortion decisions have been constitutional, provid-
ed that the laws offer an alternative, such as judicial bypass.83  The Court’s 
refusal to allow a parental veto and its requirement of an alternative to paren-
tal consent are both pivotal to understanding the Court’s balancing of the 
interests at stake in parental involvement laws.84  Bellotti II’s reasoning 
makes clear that the core justification for mandated parental involvement and 
judicial bypass is to ensure better decision making for the minor.85  Although 
the Court recognized parents’ rights to control their children’s upbringing and 
to have a voice in abortion decisions, in balancing the various interests at 
stake, the Court refused to place the parents’ rights above the minor’s repro-
ductive rights – otherwise, allowing judicial bypass or other alternatives 
would not make sense.86  Judges in bypass hearings may authorize a minor’s 
abortion care after determining: (1) that the minor is sufficiently mature to 
choose an abortion without involving a parent or, in the alternative, (2) that 
 
 79. Id.; Joan H. Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 2.05 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2013). 
 80. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Rights as Parents, supra note 41, at 2 (Con-
necticut, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Washington). 
 81. Id. (Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Rhode Island). 
 82. Id. (Pennsylvania). 
 83. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (plurality opin-
ion). 
 84. See id. at 639–41. 
 85. Id. at 640–41. 
 86. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 238–
44 (2005) (arguing that the judicial bypass alternative undercut parental rights and 
was meant to ensure minors’ access to abortion care). 
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the abortion is in her best interests.87  As discussed further below in Part II.A, 
studies analyzing the actual operation of parental involvement laws demon-
strate the failure of judicial bypass to serve as a fair compromise that im-
proves adolescent decision making. 
As of March 1, 2012, thirty-eight states require parental involvement in 
a minor’s decision to have an abortion or, in the alternative, provide for a 
judicial bypass as constitutionally required.88  In addition, five states have 
parental involvement laws that are not in effect due to court enjoinment.89  
That leaves only seven states and the District of Columbia, which have no 
parental involvement laws, actual or attempted.90  The popularity of legisla-
tion mandating parental involvement with abortion is quite striking, especial-
ly in contrast to the autonomy that almost all states grant to minors who 
choose to carry a pregnancy to term. 
When analyzed in conjunction with statutory rape laws granting teenag-
ers the right to consent to sex – typically at age sixteen – many states “grant 
minor females the right to privately and independently consent to intercourse 
and even motherhood, but not the corresponding right to obtain an abortion 
without parental involvement.”91 
* * * 
Situating abortion within these decisions relating to sexuality and repro-
duction, a minor’s right to access abortion in most states remains subject to 
either parental or state authority.  In states with parental involvement laws, 
minors do not possess fully unfettered decision-making authority over abor-
tion, as with treatment for STIs or pregnancy and childrearing.  And yet, par-
ents also do not possess a complete veto power over their teenagers’ abortion 
 
 87. See generally Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 35 (describing judicial deter-
minations of “maturity” and “best interests” in Michigan and in comparison with 
other states). 
 88. State Policies in Brief: Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, 
GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (Jan. 1, 2016), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.  Most states require 
consent or notification of only one parent, usually twenty-four or forty-eight hours 
before the procedure.  Id.  All thirty-eight states with parental involvement laws allow 
for judicial bypass as constitutionally required.  Id.  Thirty-three states permit a minor 
to obtain an abortion without parental involvement in a medical emergency.  Id.  Six-
teen states permit a minor to obtain an abortion without parental involvement in cases 
of abuse, assault, incest or neglect.  Id.  Twenty-one states require parental consent 
only, three of which require both parents to consent.  Id.  Twelve states require paren-
tal notification only, one of which requires that both parents be notified.  Id.  Five 
states require both parental consent and notification.  Id. 
 89. Id. (California, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, and New Mexico). 
 90. Id. at 2 (Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington). 
 91. Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain’t So Sweet: Rethinking the Regulation of 
Adolescent Sexuality, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 271, 283 (2011). 
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decisions as they may be able to with regard to sex education in many juris-
dictions.  The judicial bypass requirement for abortion gives minors an es-
cape route from their parents, but as many commentators have noted, this is a 
very problematic and hazardous route.92  The question remains: Why grant 
minors full authority over their pregnancy and parenting decisions while 
denying them similar authority to avoid parenthood?93  The next Part seeks to 
explain these doctrinal inconsistencies. 
II.  MINORS, PARENTS, AND MINORS AS PARENTS 
This Part seeks to better understand the law’s approach to minors’ sexu-
al and reproductive rights, both in theory and in practice.  This Part looks to 
family law doctrines and practices to make sense of the law’s unusual grant 
of adult-like rights to minor parents on the face of the law and to expose the 
reality that the law often tramples upon minor parents’ parental rights in prac-
tice. 
In Part II.A, this Article applies longstanding conventions on parental 
rights to help explain the conflicts in the law governing teenagers’ sexual and 
reproductive autonomy.  This Article shows that traditional conceptions of 
parental control continue to exert a strong influence, even in areas of the law 
that appear to expand adolescent autonomy.  For example, the rule that ado-
lescents can freely consent to STI treatment represents an extension of the 
traditional exemption from parental control for medical emergencies rather 
than a recognition of a right to sexual autonomy for adolescents.  Similarly, 
this Part argues that the law grants minor parents full parental autonomy, at 
least in theory, because of a reflexive desire to assert the rights of persons 
categorized as parents – not out of respect for a minor’s right to parent her 
child as she sees fit.  In other words, the law resists explicitly limiting paren-
tal rights, even for minor parents, out of fear that it would risk adults’ paren-
tal rights. 
Part II.B argues that, in practice, the rigid notions about parental rights 
that influence the law on adolescent reproduction do not lead to substantive 
 
 92. See infra Part II.A. 
 93. This disparity is particularly striking given that pregnancy and childbirth 
pose much more significant health risks than abortion.  See Loren M. Dobkin et al., 
Pregnancy Options Counseling for Adolescents: Overcoming Barriers to Care and 
Preserving Preference, 43 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 
96, 98 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (“Studies have consistently shown that there is a 
greater risk of a serious physical complication from childbirth than from abortion, 
with the risk of mortality on average 14 times greater for continuing a pregnancy to 
birth.  Although this ratio has not been specifically calculated for adolescents, the risk 
of complications from abortion remains low at younger ages, including less than 20 
years old.”); J. Thomas, Teenagers and Young Adults Have Elevated Maternity-
Related Risks, 44 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 207, 207 (2012) (concluding 
that teenagers are at “heightened risk of adverse outcomes” during maternity as com-
pared with adults). 
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protection of minor parents’ parental rights.  The law on adolescent reproduc-
tion appears inconsistent in its surface treatment of abortion versus childbirth, 
but a deeper analysis exposes commonalities scholars have overlooked.  Alt-
hough the law grants parental rights to minor parents in theory, a closer ex-
amination of areas of family law that deal directly with minors as parents – 
namely, child welfare law and adoption law – reveals a similarly skeptical 
view of adolescent reproductive decision making and a desire to punish fe-
male teenage sexual transgression of purity norms, whether pregnant teenage 
girls choose abortion or childbirth.  Even though the child welfare system 
also subjects adult parents from marginalized populations to high levels of 
scrutiny and disrespect of their parental rights, minor parents from marginal-
ized families remain doubly vulnerable to state action stripping their parental 
rights.94  Poor and racial minority minor parents particularly suffer under 
child welfare practices, but even teenage parents from less marginalized 
groups face risks to their parental rights under past and present adoption law 
practices.95  Ultimately, this Part demonstrates that the superficially conflict-
ing rules on adolescent abortion and childbirth work in tandem to enforce the 
traditional gender script of maternal self-sacrifice – women, and girls, should 
give birth and seek redemption for their sexual transgressions by giving up 
their children to better circumstances, no matter the emotional costs to them-
selves.96 
A.  Minor Parents’ Parental Rights in Theory 
One obvious explanation for this core contradiction  – the law’s privi-
leging of minors who choose to carry a pregnancy to term with decisional 
autonomy and punishing of minors who choose abortion by subjecting their 
decisions to parental or judicial authority  – is that these laws reflect an anti-
abortion agenda.97  I agree with critics that a large part of the motivation for 
mandating parental involvement with abortion arises from anti-abortion ad-
vocacy.98  Certainly, there are legislators and advocates of parental involve-
 
 94. See Maya Manian, Functional Parenting and Dysfunctional Abortion Policy: 
Reforming Parental Involvement Legislation, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 241, 250 (2012). 
 95. See Appleton, supra note 11, at 281 & n.144. 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 323–25 (discussing gender scripts related to motherhood and 
pregnancy). 
 97. See Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 569. 
 98. As other scholars have demonstrated, inconsistencies in the law’s treatment 
of minors based on pregnancy outcome unmask a pro-natalist agenda underlying 
parental involvement laws.  See, e.g., J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality 
of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving 
Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 149 (2003).  Gender stereotypes also 
influence the disparate treatment of teenage girls who choose childbirth over abortion.  
See Phillis, supra note 91, at 292 (“[I]f a minor female elects to carry a pregnancy to 
term she is fulfilling her natural role of ‘woman as child bearer’ and she is rewarded 
with adult, decision-making abilities.  Yet if a minor female seeks to terminate her 
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ment laws who are motivated by their anti-abortion stance, seeking to throw 
any obstacles in the way of girls’ and women’s access to abortion.99 
Taking the Supreme Court’s justification for mandated parental in-
volvement at face value, these laws should be improving adolescent decision 
making and thereby, presumably, improving the outcomes of health and well-
being for pregnant teenagers.  Yet, decades of studies on the efficacy of pa-
rental involvement legislation demonstrate that these laws harm more than 
help adolescent girls.100  Public health research on the impact of parental in-
volvement legislation on teenagers indicates that these laws do not improve 
parent-child communication, protect teenagers’ health, or reduce the number 
of abortions.101  “Instead, evidence suggests that mandated parental involve-
ment with abortion is unnecessary in many cases and harmful in others.”102  
 
pregnancy, she is refusing the stereotype of ‘woman as child bearer’ and consequent-
ly, presumed so immature as to require either parental or judicial approval of her 
decision.”).  See also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality 
Analysis of “Woman-Protective” Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 
991–94 (2007) (discussing gender stereotypes animating legislation restricting access 
to abortion).  The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart has further fueled 
gender stereotyped reasoning in the abortion context, particularly with its admittedly 
unsubstantiated claim that women regret their abortions.  See 550 U.S. 124, 159 
(2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unex-
ceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant 
life they once created and sustained.”); see also Maya Manian, The Irrational Wom-
an: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 223 (2009) (arguing that the “abortion regret” rationale in support of abortion 
restrictions reflects gender stereotypes, particularly as compared to the standard ap-
proach to informed consent); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional 
Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 
1641, 1688 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, The Right’s Reasons] (discussing Carhart’s 
reliance on claim of abortion “regret” to justify restrictions on abortion). 
 99. See Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics 
and Policy, 18 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 305, 311–15 (2004) [hereinafter Sanger, 
Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States] (arguing that the prime motivation 
behind parental involvement laws is to prevent access to abortion and punish those 
girls who seek it); Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity, Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hear-
ings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409 (2009) [hereinafter 
Sanger, Decisional Dignity].  Advocates of parental involvement mandates often raise 
the specter of regret in the context of teenage abortion, although recent studies have 
thoroughly examined and debunked the notion of post-abortion trauma for both adult 
women and adolescents.  See Trine Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abor-
tion and Risk of Mental Disorder, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332 (2011); see also Brenda 
Major et al., Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 
(2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf. 
 100. See Manian, supra note 94, at 244–46. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 
637–38 (N.J. 2000) (summarizing data on impact of the parental involvement man-
dates). 
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Studies also confirm what should be no surprise: that the judicial bypass hear-
ings cause significant psychological distress.103  Teenage girls who do not 
discuss their pregnancies with their parents often have weighty fears about 
forced disclosure, including fears of being kicked out of their family homes 
or fears of abuse.104  These teenagers’ only other option is equally distressing 
because, to prove their maturity to a judge, they must discuss the most inti-
mate details of their lives to a complete stranger in a courtroom environment 
that would intimidate most adults.105 
Scholars who have extensively analyzed the bypass process conclude 
that the judicial hearings operate primarily as a means to shame teenage girls 
for their transgression of gendered sexual purity norms.106  Judges interrogate 
girls about the most intimate aspects of their lives, in some cases asking inap-
propriate and irrelevant questions, such as demanding to know where and 
how often the individual had sex.107  Professor Carol Sanger argues that the 
harms that flow from judicial bypass include not only the risk of medical 
harm due to delay, but also the dignitary harms that arise from the humilia-
tion inflicted by the bypass hearing itself.108  Parental involvement laws also 
most heavily punish the most vulnerable and marginalized minors – those 
who lack supportive parents, parental surrogates, or the resources to readily 
access the court system.109  Professor Sanger succinctly summarizes the opin-
ion of many critics of parental involvement mandates: 
 
 103. Ehrlich, supra note 98, at 173–74. 
 104. Those minors who choose not to notify a parent fear “family conflict, physi-
cal harm, or other abuse if they told a parent about the pregnancy.”  Robert D. Web-
ster et al., Editorial, Parental Involvement Laws and Parent-Daughter Communica-
tion: Policy Without Proof, 82 CONTRACEPTION 310, 311 (2010).  One study specifi-
cally demonstrated that mandated communication could be physically harmful to 
some minors, reporting higher rates of physical violence or being beaten in cases 
where parents became aware of the pregnancy without the minors’ consent.  See id.  
In general, the literature suggests “that forced parent-daughter communication around 
abortion could be harmful or perceived as harmful for some youth.”  Id. 
 105. See Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note 
99, at 311–12. 
 106. See Jamin B. Raskin, The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Proceedings, 10 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 281, 284 (2002) (stating “that these searching voyeur-
istic hearings function primarily to . . . humiliate and to shame the young woman”); 
see also Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note 99, at 
314 (“Understanding the hearings as a means of imposing control over teenage sex 
and abortion helps explain why bypass statutes are so popular among legislatures 
despite the fact that so few petitions are denied.”). 
 107. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BYPASSING JUSTICE: PREGNANT 
MINORS AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS 28 (on file with author); see generally 
HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS 
(2007). 
 108. See Sanger, Decisional Dignity, supra note 99, at 444–79. 
 109. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 107, at 58. 
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[P]arental involvement statutes, while often couched in the language 
of family togetherness and child protection, are less concerned with 
developing sound or nuanced family policies in the area of adolescent 
reproduction than with securing a set of political goals aimed at 
thwarting access to abortion, restoring parental authority, and punish-
ing girls for having sex.110  
In short, the law on adolescent abortion expresses a skeptical view of 
adolescent reproductive decision making and an intent to punish female teen-
age sexual expression.  In comparison, the law’s puzzling approach to the 
adolescent who chooses to become a parent reflects an odd blind spot.  
Scholars have noted that it is the law’s approach to minors’ parental rights – 
not abortion law – that is “out of step” with other areas of youth law, which 
generally restricts the rights of minors.111 
This Article argues that the apparent expansion of adolescent rights with 
regard to the right to parent merely represents an application of long-standing 
rules benefitting adults rather than growing recognition of adolescents’ au-
tonomy interests.   I argue that a family law perspective – in particular a focus 
on traditional rules related to parental rights – helps to explain the law’s unu-
sual approach to teenage childbirth and childrearing.  Other than sentiments 
against abortion, deeply rooted notions about parental rights provide an addi-
tional angle for understanding the law’s conflicting approaches to minor’s 
autonomy in sexual and reproductive decision making.  In particular, this 
Article shows that conventional categories long recognized in the law for 
exempting children from parental authority illuminate the law’s contradictory 
approaches to teenage sexuality and reproduction. 
As discussed in Part I, constitutional law recognizes and reinforces 
deeply felt conceptions of parental rights, including parents’ rights to control 
decision making for their children.  However, state common law and statutory 
law have long recognized exemptions from parental authority that fall into 
two broad categories: (1) medical emergencies and (2) special status-based 
exceptions.112  The areas in which adolescents have been given greater auton-
omy over their sexual and reproductive decisions fall into one of these two 
long-standing exceptional categories in the public’s eyes, while the others 
arguably do not.113  In other words, apparent advancements in the law on 
adolescents’ sexual and reproductive autonomy actually map onto the tradi-
tional scope of parental control. 
The first category – exemption from parental consent for medical emer-
gencies – reflects common sense.  Because society wants to ensure that mi-
 
 110. Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note 99, at 
306. 
 111. Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 786 
(2000) [hereinafter Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors]. 
 112. See Hill, supra note 27, at 41–43.  See also Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 
267. 
 113. See Hill, supra note 27, at 42–43. 
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nors receive needed treatment, the law has always assumed that parents 
would consent in cases of a minor’s urgent health needs.  Generally speaking, 
minors are categorically incapable of giving informed consent to medical 
treatment.114  However, even under the conventional rule requiring parental 
permission prior to medical treatment of a minor, physicians have long been 
given the authority to treat minors without first obtaining parental consent in 
 
 114. See J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpabil-
ity and the Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 78–
80 (2003) (discussing binary classification of child/parent; no separate legal status of 
adolescence); Rhonda G. Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless 
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1306–22 (2000) (minors cannot consent to most 
medical procedures or execute advanced directives); Scott, The Legal Construction of 
Adolescence, supra note 1, at 566.  Parents generally possess the authority to decide 
when a child will receive medical treatment.  See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 
(1979) (upholding a law permitting the voluntary commitment of a child by parents to 
a state mental hospital if the physician agrees).  In addition to the exceptions to this 
rule for medical emergencies and status-based exceptions, the mature minor doctrine 
allows minors to seek medical care from a judge, who determines a minor’s maturity 
on a case-by-case basis.  See Hill, supra note 27, at 42–49 (“The mature-minor rule . . 
. generally calls for a case-by-case assessment of an individual minor’s circumstanc-
es.”); Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 268; Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and 
Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 127 (1996) [hereinafter Oberman, Minor Rights 
and Wrongs] (discussing mature minor doctrine).  Michelle Oberman has argued that 
maturity in the healthcare context “operates as a code word, invoked to permit minors 
access to treatments that society deems desirable, and to limit their access to treat-
ments that carry the possibility of long-term negative consequences.”  Id.  Discussing 
the mature minor case law involving a minor’s assertion of the right to refuse lifesav-
ing medical treatment, Oberman argues that court decisions ultimately rested “on 
subjective judicial assessments of the patients’ maturity” and that “the courts are 
remarkably ill equipped to make such determinations” of maturity.  Id. at 128.  Other 
scholars have reached similar conclusions with regard to case-by-case judicial as-
sessments of maturity in the criminal context.  See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence 
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 836–37 (2003) (stating that determin-
ing maturity of young offenders in individual cases “is likely to be an error-prone 
undertaking, with the outcomes determined by factors other than immaturity”).  Ex-
tensive analysis of judicial bypass hearings in the abortion context also reveals the 
arbitrariness of case-by-case judicial determinations of adolescent capacity for deci-
sion-making.  See Manian, supra note 94, at 244–46 (summarizing literature criticiz-
ing judicial bypass hearings).  Elizabeth Scott argues that the judicial bypass system 
in abortion law is a means of recognizing adolescence as a unique stage between 
childhood and adulthood, but one that is a “costly regulatory scheme [that] offers little 
in the way of social benefit.”  Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra 
note 1, at 569, 574–76 (critiquing judicial bypass process in abortion context).  See 
also Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Par-
ent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 413–14 (1997) (noting that in the abor-
tion context teenage girls “have been granted a peculiar sort of burdened autonomy 
that substitutes state authority for parental authority, and that asks pregnant girls to 
show far more initiative and competence than the Court has asked of adult women 
seeking abortions”). 
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cases of medical emergencies.115  Under the medical emergency exception, 
“the guardian’s consent to emergency care was implied, on the theory that 
any delay incurred in attempting to secure consent would jeopardize the mi-
nor’s health.”116  The exemption for medical emergencies has, over time, 
become more broadly understood to include the unique medical needs of ado-
lescents and a common list of treatment-based exemptions, such as treatment 
for drug dependency, mental health issues, and sexuality-related problems.117  
Scholars generally agree that the treatment-based exemptions to parental con-
sent are an extension of the traditional exemption for medical emergencies, 
both of which are based on the desire to ensure that children receive needed 
medical care, rather than support for adolescent autonomy interests.118 
We can map the modern rules granting adolescents greater autonomy in 
access to sexual and reproductive healthcare onto the traditional medical 
“emergency” exemption.  For example, the universal rule across the fifty 
states that minors may independently consent to STI treatment falls within 
this first categorical exception to parental rights for children’s urgent health 
needs.119  The exception to parental consent for prenatal care similarly ap-
pears to be grounded not on the belief that teenagers make particularly sound 
decisions in these matters, but rather on the understanding that adolescents 
are more likely to make the choice to seek treatment – the choice that legisla-
tors and parents view as best – if not required to reveal their need for treat-
ment to their parents.120  Couched in the neutral language of public health, 
 
 115. Hill, supra note 27, at 41 (“[M]edical emergencies require no consent; in-
deed, this is true for adults as well as children.”). 
 116. Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130. 
 117. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 256–72. 
 118. See id. (noting that treatment-based exceptions were based on public health 
goals and concern about larger societal costs rather than notions of adolescent capaci-
ty or rights); Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130–31; Ober-
man, Turning Girls Into Women, supra note 67, at 47 (“[A] close examination of the 
line of cases which govern minors’ rights to consent to treatment . . . reveals that the 
changes in these rights have been driven not by a sense that minors are mature enough 
to make such decisions, but rather, by a belief that certain forms of treatment are so 
important that the law should facilitate access to them.”); MAXINE EICHNER, THE 
SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 129 
(2010) (noting that laws granting minors treatment-based exceptions to parental con-
sent for birth control, STIs, drug abuse, and mental health issues exist “not because 
minors have especially mature judgment in these areas; instead . . . the threat to chil-
dren’s long-term welfare tips the scales in favor of allowing them decision making 
power”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 
37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1617 (1992) [hereinafter Scott, Judgment and Reasoning] 
(“The policies dealing with medical decisionmaking [sic] also fit within a paternal-
istic framework. . . .  There is little evidence that policymakers are moved by concern 
for minors’ autonomy interest in making decisions about sexual activity.”). 
 119. See Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130. 
 120. See Wadlington, supra note 10, at 323–24 (noting that state laws granting 
minors autonomy for specific types of medical treatment, such as drug abuse and 
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rather than in the language of advocacy for adolescent sexual autonomy, these 
parental consent exemptions granted to minors have generated little to no 
controversy.121 
In comparison, where the public finds the urgency of the minor’s health 
needs to be debatable, controversy continues over whether to deviate from the 
norm of deference to parents’ right to authority over their children.122  For 
example, with regard to sex education and contraceptive services, the public 
still vehemently debates whether more or less access will harm children’s 
health and development.123  Those jurisdictions that take the view that dimin-
ished access to contraception will better promote adolescent development, 
 
STIs, are not based on a state’s interest in affording children greater autonomy but 
rather in ensuring that minors obtain important medical treatment they would other-
wise delay or avoid if parental involvement were required); see also Oberman, Minor 
Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130 (“[T]he purposes underlying laws that 
treat minors like adults have almost nothing to do with the perceived maturity of the 
adolescent population.  A critical evaluation of the mature minor doctrine reveals that 
these laws, like those before them, grow out of the traditional impulse to protect this 
population.”); Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1618–19 (“[T]he 
law cares about the quality of adolescent judgment and . . . policies extending the 
freedom to make choices are limited by paternalistic goals. . . .  [T]he medical consent 
statutes, while they appear to endorse greater adolescent autonomy, are equally con-
sistent with a response directed toward promoting adolescent welfare and reducing 
social cost.”). 
 121. Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 269–71 (noting that treatment-based excep-
tions were based on public health goals rather than notions of adolescent capacity or 
rights); Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130 (“This public 
health concern [regarding spread of disease], coupled with a fear that teens would not 
seek treatment for these communicable conditions if their parents had to be notified 
of—let alone give consent for—such treatment, led states to pass ‘minor treatment 
statutes.’”). 
 122. Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 131 (“Minor treat-
ment statutes reflect a public consensus that ensuring minors’ access to the given 
treatment outweighs parental interests in controlling the care a child receives.  The 
focus of such exceptions rests not on an assessment of maturity, but on a calculus that 
grants minors autonomy only when the treatment is relatively low risk, and when 
denying access may cause the minor (or the public at large) to suffer permanent 
harm.”). 
 123. Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 791–92 (noting that 
legislation battling teenage pregnancy and other problems related to teenage sexuality 
takes conflicting approaches). 
 
Laws provide for contraceptive counseling and services . . . and for sexual ed-
ucation, all on the theory that, if teenagers are having sex, information and 
contraceptives will reduce the bad consequences of their sexual activity.  Oth-
er laws restrict minors’ access to contraceptives and require the affirmative 
promotion of abstinence, on the theory that this approach will alter adolescent 
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perhaps because they believe that access to contraception encourages sexual 
activity, emphasize the conventional family law exceptions to parental au-
thority; as a result, they explicitly grant minors independent access to pre-
scription contraceptive services where the minor demonstrates an urgent 
health need.124  With regard to abortion, it appears that members of the public 
in many states, including those that otherwise lean in favor of abortion rights, 
find the health risks of delayed access to abortion care to be a debatable prop-
osition, despite clear medical evidence of the harms of such delays.125 
In sum, applying the law’s traditional medical emergency exemption to 
the parental right of control over minors holds explanatory power for the va-
riety of contradictory approaches that states take to granting minors autono-
my in their sexual and reproductive healthcare decision making.126  What this 
 
 124. For example, as discussed above, although about half the states explicitly by 
law allow minors to freely consent to prescription contraceptives, the remaining states 
follow a more traditional approach, explicitly by statute granting minors’ an exemp-
tion from parental authority when they meet certain status based requirements (dis-
cussed further infra) or need unfettered access to protect their health.  See supra Part 
I.C.2.  Twenty-five states explicitly permit minors to consent to prescription contra-
ceptive services if they are or have been pregnant, parenting or married, or have a 
medical need.  See supra Part I.C.2.  In those states with expanded access to prescrip-
tion contraceptives, the push for expanded access to contraceptive services for minors 
“was cast not in terms of the minor’s actual maturity, but instead, as a response to a 
public health threat—the increase in teen sex, and the consequent risks of venereal 
diseases, pregnancies, and illegitimate births.”  Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women, 
supra note 67, at 49. 
 125. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 107, 1–4; Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 
supra note 114, at 131 (“The cumbersome route to permitting adolescents to consent 
to abortion reflects the politically divisive nature of the abortion debate, and the fact 
that, unlike contraception, there is less public consensus about whether it is in a mi-
nor’s best interest to procure an abortion.  This debate is not about adolescent capaci-
ty—it is about parental rights to control their children.”).  There is clear medical evi-
dence on the harms of such delays.  See Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Le-
gal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 729, 731 (2004) (“[T]here is a 38% increase in risk of death for each 
additional week of gestation. . . .  [T]he increase in the risk of death due to delaying 
the procedure by 1 week is much higher at later gestational ages than at earlier gesta-
tional ages.”); see also Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies, and Facial Challenges, 36 
HAST. CONST. L.Q. 611, 621 (2009).  Courts that have struck down parental involve-
ment mandates have done so primarily on the ground that such laws harm teenage 
girls’ health.  See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000).  
See Rebouché, supra note 5, at 208 (discussing the 2008 defeat of the California 
Proposition 4 parental involvement law, where health arguments against the law suc-
ceeded). 
 126. Elizabeth Scott also demonstrates that “policies that appear to signal an ero-
sion of the paternalistic legal framework in fact fit quite comfortably within it.”  
Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1612.  Professor Scott further 
argues:  
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Article previously referred to as “pre-sexual activity” decisions about sex 
education and contraceptives may fall under a more broadly understood med-
ical “emergency” exception to parental control, but controversy continues to 
rage on these issues depending on the view of which approach better protects 
adolescent health.  The need for minors’ autonomy in “post-sexual activity” 
decisions relating to STI treatment and pregnancy services seems clearly 
grounded in the view that parental consent must be rejected out of medical 
necessity, a view that has not taken widespread hold with regard to abortion.  
Of course, politics surrounding teenage sexuality and abortion also influence 
the law here.127  The key point is that where minors’ rights to independently 
access healthcare related to sexuality and reproduction have been expanded, 
this expansion of rights tends to be motivated by the traditional exemption 
from parental control for medical emergencies and public health needs, rather 
than by a concern for minors’ autonomy interests in decision making sur-
rounding sex and reproduction.128 
Turning to the second traditional exemption to parental authority for 
minors who fall into special statuses helps to explain the law’s conflicting 
approach to teenage childbirth versus abortion and, in particular, the law’s 
unusual grant of authority to minor parents.  State law has long recognized 
status-based exceptions to parental authority for minors who are in some form 
“emancipated.”129  Freedom from parental control can occur either by a for-
mal emancipation process130 or automatically by entering into certain status-
 
 
[E]ven advocates of expanded rights for adolescents are generally instrumental-
ist in their approach to autonomy and are ultimately driven by paternalistic 
goals.  At the heart of this paternalism is a commonly shared intuition that mi-
nors have poorer judgment than adults and that they are more likely than adults 
to make choices that are threatening to their health and well-being. 
 
Id. 
 127. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 86, at 23–40 (the law granting minors fairly 
liberal abortion rights is motivated by concerns about the public health problem, and 
not by concerns about minor’s rights); Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After 
Roper v. Simmons: “Kids are Just Different” and “Kids are Like Adults” Advocacy 
Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 273, 291 (2008) (discussing a child 
advocate’s moral, political, philosophical, and religious views as related to minor 
autonomy rights); Wadlington, supra note 10, at 324 (“These are situations where 
legislatures feared that minors would be unwilling to seek assistance or consent from 
their parents.  If minors could not personally consent to treatment, they might not 
obtain medical care -- to the detriment of themselves, their families, and society.”). 
 128. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1617. 
 129. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating 
Children in Minor Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 262 (1992). 
 130. Minors who obtain the legal status of emancipation are treated as adults in 
most of their dealings with parents and third parties.  See id. (discussing processes and 
consequences of emancipation and arguing that emancipation does not always serve 
stated end of benefitting mature minors).  Thus, emancipated minors can freely con-
sent to medical treatment – and otherwise ignore their parents’ commands – while 
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es.131  In particular, these statuses include marriage, military service, and, to a 
lesser extent, becoming a parent.132 
The rationale for this second category of status-based exemptions to pa-
rental authority is less clear than the medical emergency category.  Some 
argue that minors who are married or in the military are exempted from pa-
rental authority for reasons of administrative expediency.133  The status-based 
exceptions perhaps also reflect underlying notions traditional in family law of 
the child as the “property” of her parents or, traditionally, of her father.134  In 
other words, only one person should be in charge of a minor, and marriage or 
military service transfers power to a new authority.  This notion of child as 
property of her parents may further explicate the differential treatment of 
pregnant minors who choose childbirth rather than abortion.  Although minor 
parents are not automatically “emancipated” from their own parents’ authori-
ty in most jurisdictions, they still possess full parental authority over their 
infants in all states, at least in theory.135  Once the minor takes on the mantle 
 
conversely parents owe no duty of support to their emancipated minors.  See id.  A 
parent or minor can seek formal legal emancipation in court on a case-by-case basis, 
which typically requires that the minor demonstrate that she has established a separate 
domicile and financial independence.  See id. at 245–46.  See also Oberman, Minor 
Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130 (“The definition of emancipation varies 
from state to state, but it is generally limited to minors who are not living at home, 
who are not economically dependent on their parents, and whose parents have surren-
dered parental duties.  In the past, this category consisted primarily of married minors 
and minors in the military service.”); Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 266–67 (explain-
ing the processes for emancipation, either by court order or automatically by statuses 
such as marriage, military service, or parenthood). 
 131. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 267. 
 132. Both statutes and case law in most states declare that minors who marry or 
enlist in the military may be free from parental authority and obligation.  See HOMER 
H. CLARK, Jr., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 326 (2d ed. 
1988); Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adoles-
cent Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 770–
79 (2002) (discussing the general rule that minors cannot consent to medical treat-
ment unless they qualify for the narrow treatment-based exceptions or qualify for 
traditional status-based exceptions, such as minors who are in the military, married, 
pregnant, or parenting). 
 133. See Hill, supra note 27, at 41–43 (discussing classes of minors deemed “suf-
ficiently adult-like to consent to care as if they were adults,” including minors who 
are married or in the military); Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 129, at 258 (stating 
that statutory emancipation for minors who are married and enlisted in the military 
rests on the premise that the new social status is inconsistent with parental control). 
 134. Stuart N. Hart, From Property to Person Status: Historical Perspective on 
Children’s Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53 (1991) (discussing transition of children 
from property to personhood); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Per-
sonhood: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING 
POVERTY 313, 313 (1998). 
 135. “In some jurisdictions, becoming a parent results in emancipation; in most it 
does not.”  Barbara Glesner Fines, Challenges of Representing Adolescent Parents in 
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of parenthood herself, she obtains the full rights of parenthood over her child 
as her parents have over her – she achieves the status of parent. 
On the surface, family law takes a seemingly categorical approach to 
parenthood.  The law generally categorizes persons as either “parents” or 
“children”; the law does not explicitly recognize an in-between status for 
minor parents.  Thus, a minor who seeks to terminate her pregnancy chooses 
to remain in the “child” category: her role vis-a-vis her parents remains un-
changed.  In contrast, a minor who gives birth falls into both categories.  She 
is a child and a parent at the same time – still a child in her parents’ eyes yet 
now also a parent herself. 136 
The law seems unable, or perhaps unwilling, to grasp how to explicitly 
recognize both roles in the same person, at the same moment.  Superficially, 
the law takes an indivisible approach to minor parenthood by granting the 
minor parent the full panoply of parental rights and duties, although it need 
not do so.137  At least on its face, the law treats a minor who decides to carry 
her pregnancy to term as possessing all of the attendant rights and obligations 
of parenthood and relegates the minor’s parents to the role of grandparents 
with correspondingly limited rights.138  According to conventional rules of 
family law, parents uniquely possess the fundamental right to make decisions 
for their children.  Thus, to the extent that the minor is acting as a parent to-
ward her own child, it follows from the familiar doctrines of family law that 
the minor should be allowed to make autonomous decisions relating to her 
infant, including making medical treatment decisions or relinquishing the 
infant for adoption.139  From this parental rights perspective, it is logical to 
both deny autonomy to a minor who chooses abortion while at the same time 
granting a minor parent autonomy over her pregnancy and child, despite the 
possibility that in both cases, the minor may be equally immature.  As dis-
cussed previously, none of these exceptions to parental authority – treatment-
based or status-based – are in fact grounded on a notion of minor maturity or 
capacity for sound decision making. 
 
Child Welfare Proceedings, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 324–25 (2011); see also 
Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 830. 
 136. These rules on minor parenthood apply to minor fathers as well; however, 
my focus is on teenage girls since teenage parents rarely marry, and the father’s in-
volvement is often minimal.  See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 
111, at 787–88. 
 137. See id. at 793–94 (arguing that granting minor parents the full panoply of 
parental rights is not constitutionally mandated since “rights afforded the highest level 
of constitutional protection for adults are circumscribed for all minors, based on their 
age alone”). 
 138. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 139. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opin-
ion) (“[T]he fact of having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for 
parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for 
the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.”). 
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The fact of pregnancy and motherhood does not make a teenager more 
mature, but the law has treated status-based grants of autonomy as grounds 
for independence based on “ease of application and a need for consistency, 
rather than a recognition of the minor’s [capacity for] autonomy.”140  To be 
clear, I am not arguing that family law dictates the law’s inconsistent treat-
ment of minors who choose childbirth versus abortion.  In fact, modern fami-
ly law parses out parental authority in much more nuanced ways.141  Prece-
dents on the scope of children’s rights indicate that states could constitution-
ally limit the rights of minor parents for the same three reasons that states 
may limit minors’ access to abortion: (1) the minors’ vulnerability, (2) the 
minors’ immaturity and resulting limited decision-making capacity, and (3) 
the parents’ important role in controlling their minor child’s upbringing.142  
Poor decision making in the context of minor parenting may lead to life-long 
detrimental impacts for the minor parent, for the minor’s parents, and for the 
minor’s child, which could provide sufficient constitutional justification for 
constraints on a minor’s parenting decisions as on decisions to terminate a 
pregnancy.143  Arguably, the law should grant adult parents more control over 
 
 140. Rosato, supra note 132, at 777; see also Belotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 n.23 
(“[T]he problem of determining ‘maturity’ makes clear why the State generally may 
resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such as age limits, marital 
status, or membership in the Armed Forces for lifting some or all of the legal disabili-
ties of minority.”).  For example, married minors are typically treated as emancipated 
even though many married minors continue to live with relatives and to receive finan-
cial assistance from their parents.  See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 129, at 304 
n.263. 
 141. See infra Part III.B. 
 142. See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 797–822 (argu-
ing that rationales for restricting minors’ access to abortion and other constitutional 
rights justify similar restrictions on minors’ parental rights); see also Bellotti II, 443 
U.S. at 633–34 (plurality opinion). 
 143. Obviously there are vastly differing opinions on the moral significance of the 
decision to abort versus carrying a pregnancy to term.  Even those opposed to abor-
tion, however, would likely concede that the decision to become a teenage parent has 
a dramatic effect on the course of a teenager’s life.  Professor Emily Buss argues that, 
particularly given the potential long-term negative consequences of teenage mother-
hood for all three generations, it is striking that “where immature decision making 
produces a teenage mother, the law applies no protective brakes.”  Buss, The Parental 
Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 793 (discussing negative consequences of teen-
age parenthood to parents of the minor, the minor parent herself and her child).  Pro-
fessor Buss suggests a more nuanced approach that would recognize that the minor 
parent’s parents still have parental rights that could temper an adolescent’s own pa-
rental rights, such as by requiring shared custodial decision making between the mi-
nor parent and her parents.  See id. at 806 (noting that when “minor and parent are 
collapsed into one individual,” there may be “two individuals hav[ing] potentially 
dueling parental claims,” namely the minor parent versus her parents).  She also ar-
gues that states could constitutionally limit the scope of minor parents’ rights in ways 
similar to minors’ abortion rights or through other alternatives, such as shared custody 
with the minor’s parents until the minor parent comes of age.  See id. at 817–18. 
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their teenagers by granting the adult parents greater rights over the teenage 
parent’s infant and by explicitly crafting an in-between limited parental rights 
status for minor parents.  Yet, in theory, the law protects minor parents’ pa-
rental rights as strongly as it protects the rights of parents of minors seeking 
abortion.  This contradiction appears to be rooted in family law’s deeply held 
notions about parental rights, a notion that holds even when the parent is a 
minor.144  My point is not that these rules are sensible or normatively appro-
priate.  Nor am I claiming that anti-abortion sentiment has nothing to do with 
the popularity of parental involvement laws or that parental involvement with 
abortion is the correct policy approach.145  Rather, this analysis demonstrates 
that the existing, conflicting rules governing adolescent pregnancy and par-
enting map directly onto the law’s traditional, formal protection of adults’ 
parental rights.146 
As Elizabeth Scott has demonstrated, progress in the context of adoles-
cent “rights” is an illusion, since “many of the reforms that expand adolescent 
self-determination are wholly consistent with traditional goals of promoting 
children’s welfare, furthering social welfare and preserving parental authori-
 
 144. Professor Buss argues that “there is something about parental rights that 
makes them uniquely resistant to . . . regulation.”  Id. at 811.  She notes that the no-
tion of parental control runs so deep that no law in any of the fifty states “qualifies 
minors’ legal rights to control the upbringing of their children, even if they give birth 
at the age of eleven.”  Id. at 792 (discussing the negative consequences of teenage 
parenthood to parents of the minor, the minor parent herself and her child). 
 
Contrast the volume and variety of these approaches [to contraception and 
abortion] with the absolute lack of any legislation aimed at mitigating the 
three-generational harm imposed if and when the minor decides to keep the 
baby and take on parental responsibilities.  In no state does the law require the 
minor to consult with her parents, let alone to obtain parental consent, before 
acting on these decisions. 
 
Id.; see PATRICIA DONOVAN, OUR DAUGHTERS’ DECISIONS: THE CONFLICT IN STATE 
LAW ON ABORTION AND OTHER ISSUES 17 (1992) (“[N]o state requires a minor to 
have parental consent to continue a pregnancy to term.  Once a teenager has borne a 
child, she can decide whether to raise the child herself or put it up for adoption.”). 
 145. See Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note 
99, at 313.  Professor Sanger also notes that parental involvement with abortion reas-
serts parental control over teenage sexuality, a control that was lost with changes in 
the law on juvenile delinquency.  Id. 
 146. It is important to note that although in theory the law strongly protects par-
ents’ fundamental right to control their children’s upbringing, poor and racial minori-
ty parents of all ages have long been subjected to state scrutiny and weakened paren-
tal rights within the child welfare system in particular and in “public” family law in 
general.  See generally Jill E. Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
825 (2004) (discussing welfare law as public family law).  See infra Part II.B.1 (dis-
cussing child welfare). 
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ty.”147  Just as the “expansion” of adolescents’ self-determination in the con-
text of sensitive medical treatment actually serves traditional paternalistic and 
instrumentalist objectives – that adolescents should receive the medical care 
that adults would like them to have – so too do the expansive parental rights 
of minor parents perhaps merely reflect the law’s reflexive reaffirmation of 
parental authority to protect those who typically achieve the status of parent: 
adults.  The law resists any overt reduction of parental rights, even for mi-
nors, because this reduction could pose a threat to the authority and certainty 
of the traditional model of parental rights.  In other words, the law’s grant of 
parental rights to minor parents serves to protect the interests of adults, as in 
so many other areas of supposed advancements for children’s “rights.”148 
The autonomy granted to minor parents – unusual in the context of a 
body of youth law that generally denies minors any adult-like rights – appears 
to be a superficial, reflexive assertion of the rights of persons who achieve the 
status of parent by childbirth.  While paying lip service to the parental rights 
of minors, the law fails to support adolescent parenting in reality.  The next 
Part examines areas of family law that, in practice, deal directly with minors 
as parents.  In particular, this Part focuses on child welfare and adoption law.  
A closer study of what happens when minor parents come into contact with 
the law reveals that the formalist approach to parental rights that informs the 
law’s surface grant of autonomy to teenage parents does not carry through to 
substantively protect the rights of minor parents.  In some contexts, as in 
adoption law, the law’s authorization of adult-like parental “rights” to minors 
may actually serve to undermine minors’ abilities to parent their children.  
Minor mothers, in particular, endure the worst of both worlds: the lack of 
governmental support faced by adult parents and the extensive state oversight 
enforced upon minors. 
B.  Minor Parents’ Parental Rights in Practice 
A more expansive inquiry into the law on minors’ reproductive decision 
making reveals a troubling approach to adolescent pregnancy and parenting.  
If we look at the whole picture of adolescents’ reproductive rights, comparing 
abortion law and the law on minor parents’ parental rights, we will see that 
the law undermines adolescents’ rights whichever path of pregnancy resolu-
tion they choose.  At the same time that the law thwarts adolescents’ access to 
abortion care, it also fails to protect adolescents’ rights as parents.  Although, 
in theory, minor parents possess the same rights as adults to bear and rear 
children, in reality, minor parents’ parental rights are tenuous.149  Minor par-
 
 147. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1615–21 (analyzing legal 
reforms in juvenile justice and medical decision-making, and concluding that reform 
is an illusion). 
 148. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 86, at xii–iii, 174–244 (discussing how rheto-
ric of children’s rights is used in law and politics to further adults’ interests). 
 149. Id. at 244. 
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ents from poor communities and, in particular, racial minorities, remain dou-
bly vulnerable to disruption of their parental rights. 
This Part more closely examines the reality of minor parents’ abilities to 
rear their children and unmasks similarities in the law’s approach to adoles-
cent abortion and adolescent parenthood, similarities that scholars have pre-
viously overlooked.  This Part focuses primarily on adolescent mothers, given 
the greater likelihood of their involvement in parenting decisions.150  This 
Part examines how minor mothers fare when they come into contact with the 
legal system, particularly within the contexts of child welfare law and adop-
tion law.  This examination reveals two key insights.  First, the law takes a 
highly skeptical view of adolescent girls’ reproductive decision making, 
whether they seek to terminate their pregnancies or to parent their children.  
Second, legal rules that claim to protect adolescents’ interests, such as judi-
cial bypass in the abortion context and the right to relinquish in the adoption 
context, instead provide a means to punish female teenage sexuality and en-
force gender norms.  Rather than standing in conflict, the law on minor par-
ents operates in conjunction with abortion law to enforce a traditional gender 
script – that self-sacrificing mothers should give birth and give up their in-
fants to better circumstances than teenage parents can presumably provide.151 
As this Part will show, adolescent parents remain at an especially high 
risk of oversight by the child welfare system and, therefore, of having the 
state remove their children from their custody.152  Although ample research 
has shown that poor minority adult parents also face a high risk of scrutiny by 
child welfare agents, minor mothers encounter multiple layers of bias based 
on their age, as well as their race, poverty, and gender.153  Girls in foster care 
who confront a higher risk of teenage pregnancy remain particularly vulnera-
ble to the involuntary removal of their infants or pressure to surrender for 
adoption, due in part to state officials’ skepticism of teenagers’ abilities to 
parent.  The tenuousness of minors’ legal rights to access abortion or to par-
ent their children is especially apparent for the most vulnerable groups of 
 
 150. Other scholars have examined the ways in which adolescent fathers’ rights 
are also given short shrift, particularly in the adoption context.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 151. See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1308–10 (discussing the consistent 
notion in anti-abortion law of punishing women’s sexual irresponsibility). 
 152. The “child welfare system” refers to the government system responsible for 
preventing and addressing child abuse and neglect.  How the Child Welfare System 
Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY 1 (Feb. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.
gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf; Issue Brief: Rebuild the Nation’s Child Welfare 
System, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. (Jan. 2009), http://www.aecf.org/m/resource
doc/aecf-IssueBriefRebuildChildWelfareSystem-2009.pdf.  Parents and children in 
the child welfare system may receive services in their home, through foster care, or 
through adoptive placements.  How the Child Welfare System Works, supra, at 3.  
Proceedings to adjudicate child abuse or neglect cases are also referred to as “depend-
ency proceedings.”  Id. at 4. 
 153. See Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 331. 
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minors, as laws restricting access to abortion and child welfare practices dis-
proportionately affect the poor and racial minorities. 
With regard to adoption law, opponents of abortion present adoption as 
a better alternative to abortion, but research on adoption practices presents a 
disturbing picture of unwarranted and less than voluntary removals of minor 
parents’ infants by both private actors and state agents.154  To be clear, this 
Article is not arguing for the removal of state oversight of teenage parents; 
protecting the well-being of adolescent parents and their infants remains a 
worthy goal.  Rather, society needs more effective oversight that supports 
minors’ reproductive decision making and seeks to preserve their parental 
rights if they wish to parent their infants.  The analysis below demonstrates 
that, despite the formal grant of full parental rights to minor parents, the law 
often undermines rather than supports those rights. 
1.  Minor Parents and the Child Welfare System 
Experts generally agree that the child welfare system is broken.155  The 
vast majority of child welfare cases involve poverty-related neglect rather 
than severe abuse.156  Thousands of children are removed from their parents’ 
custody each year, even though few emerge better off than if they had re-
mained in their homes.157  Teenage parents present particularly difficult chal-
lenges for the system. 
The United States has the highest adolescent pregnancy rate and birth 
rate of any industrialized nation.158  Each year, almost 750,000 girls between 
the ages of fifteen and nineteen become pregnant.  Roughly sixty percent of 
these girls give birth.159  The lives of teenage mothers rarely resemble the 
nearly idyllic reality of teen motherhood portrayed in media depictions, such 
as the film, Juno, or the television show, Glee. 
Although it is a common intuition that teenage parenthood is likely to 
lead to poverty, recent research shows that teenage parenthood may be caused 
 
 154. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 98, at 1678 n.122 (describing the 
rise of contemporary arguments for adoption as preferable to abortion). 
 155. See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
113, 114 (2013); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 637 (2006). 
 156. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 115 n.7. 
 157. See id. at 114. 
 158. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 308.  See also Fast Facts: Teen Birth 
Rates: How Does the United States Compare?, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN 
& UNPLANNED PREGNANCY (Aug. 2014), https://thenationalcampaign.org/resource/
fast-facts-how-does-united-states-compare. 
 159. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 308.  For example, in 2008, 141,428 girls 
under the age of eighteen gave birth.  Id.  About four percent of these mothers were 
under the age of fifteen, twelve percent were age fifteen, and twenty-nine percent 
were age sixteen.  Id.; Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2008, 59 NAT’L 
VITAL STAT. REP. 7 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_01.pdf. 
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by poverty.160  Poor young women are more likely to become pregnant than 
their economically better off peers.161  Teenage motherhood is a symptom of 
poverty that often cycles to the next generation.  Generally speaking, teenage 
mothers are more likely to need public assistance compared to girls of similar 
socio-economic status who postpone childbirth.162  Adolescent mothers are 
also significantly less likely than their non-parenting peers to complete high 
school or obtain a GED by the age of twenty-two.163  Furthermore, as with 
adult parents, poverty places minor parents at a greater risk of oversight from 
the child welfare system.164  Bias in the child welfare system has been the 
subject of extensive study and criticism, and ample evidence suggests that 
poverty and race place adult parents at a higher risk of state intervention.165 
 
 160. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 309; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, End-
ing Poverty by Cutting Teenaged Births: Promise, Failure, and Paths to the Future, 
57 OHIO ST. L.J 441, 455 (1996) (“Teen mothers come overwhelmingly from disad-
vantaged socioeconomic backgrounds.”); Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: 
Minors’ Consent in Abortion and Adoption, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 109–10 
(2013) (discussing studies on a causal link between poverty and teen pregnancy). 
 161. See Merritt, supra note 160, at 443. 
 
[S]tudies sound a warning that poor outcomes for the children of teenaged 
mothers may derive more from poverty than from the teenaged births them-
selves.  And the studies raise the dispiriting prospect that these women and 
their children might not fare much better even if they deferred childbearing in-
to their twenties. 
 
Id. at 458–59. 
 162. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 309.  Teenage mothers are disproportion-
ately likely to be poor and to rely on welfare.  Merritt, supra note 160, at 441–42.  See 
also NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 166–67 (2010) (“[N]umerous studies 
find that delay in child bearing . . . increased mother and child prospects.”). 
 163. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 309 (sixty-six percent and ninety-four per-
cent respectively).  See Kate Perper et al., Fact Sheet: Diploma Attainment Among 
Teen Mothers, CHILD TRENDS (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.childtrends.org/files/child_trends-2010_01_22_FS_
diplomaattainment.pdf.  Studies show teenage mothers are more likely to drop out of 
school.  Merritt, supra note 160, at 441; Daniel H. Klepinger et al., Adolescent Fertili-
ty and the Educational Attainment of Young Women, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 23, 23 
(1995) (analysis shows early childbearing lowers the education attainment of young 
women of all races).  Other demographic factors also influence the likelihood of teen-
age motherhood, such as family structure.  See id.; see also Fact Sheet: American 
Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 2014), http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.html. 
 164. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 313; Erica Turcios et al., Remaining vs. 
Removal: Preventing Premature Removal when Poverty is Confused with Neglect, 12 
MICH. CHILD WELFARE L.J. 20, 23 (2009). 
 165. See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 155 (summarizing evidence of racial bias in the 
child welfare system); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD 
WELFARE (2001) (arguing that the child welfare system is deeply racially biased); 
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However, teenage parents face additional hurdles to preserving their pa-
rental rights based on their minority.  Multiple vectors of discrimination, in-
cluding gender, race, and class, intersect with age-based concerns, leaving 
minor parents doubly vulnerable to disruption of their parental rights.  Minor 
parents are generally more likely to come into contact with the child welfare 
system than adult parents.166  For mothers age fifteen or younger, the risk of 
the state removing their child from their care due to neglect or abuse are near-
ly double that of mothers between twenty and twenty-one years old.167  Ado-
lescents who are themselves wards of the state are more likely to become teen 
parents than their peers,168 presenting particularly thorny problems for the 
child welfare system.169  This population of parenting wards “is nearly invisi-
ble in the academic literature of both law and the social sciences, in state pol-
 
Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False 
Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871 (2009) (debating the reasons 
for disproportionate numbers of minority families, particularly black families, in the 
child welfare system). 
 166. See Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310. 
 167. See id. (“Teen mothers between the ages of eighteen and nineteen are one-
third more likely to have a child put in foster care and are nearly 40% more likely to 
have a case of abuse or neglect reported against them than women who waited until 
age twenty or twenty-one to have their first child.”); Robert M. Goerge et al., Conse-
quences of Teen Childbearing for Child Abuse, Neglect, and Foster Care Placement, 
in KIDS HAVING KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TEEN 
PREGNANCY 276 (Saul D. Hoffman & Rebecca A. Maynard eds., 2d ed. 2008) 
(“[C]hildren born to mothers age 15 or younger as nearly two times (1.75) as likely as 
children born to mothers age 20–21 to have an indicated child abuse or neglect report, 
and children born to mothers age 16–17 are 1.41 times as likely to become victims of 
child abuse or neglect, even after controlling for the other demographic factors.”). 
 168. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310–11; Eve Stotland & Cynthia Godsoe, 
The Legal Status of Pregnant and Parenting Youth in Foster Care, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2006) (“[D]ata demonstrates not just that a significant number of 
foster youth are pregnant and parenting, but that the incidence of pregnancy and 
parenthood is higher among foster youth than among their peers.”).  A national study 
found that the rate of teen parenthood for girls in foster care was almost double as 
compared to girls outside the system (17.2% and 8.2% respectively).  Id.; see also 
Briefly: Opportunities to Help Youth in Foster Care: Addressing Pregnancy Preven-
tion in the Implementation of the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing 
Adoptions Act of 2008, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED 
PREGNANCY 1 (2009), https://thenationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-
primary-download/Briefly_Youth_Foster_Care.pdf (showing that teenage girls in 
foster care are 2.5 times more likely to get pregnant by age nineteen than their peers 
not in foster care); PETER J. PECORA ET AL., FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDIES, 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF FOSTER CARE: EARLY RESULTS FROM THE CASEY 
NATIONAL ALUMNI STUDY 23 (2003), 
http://www.casey.org/media/AlumniStudy_US_Report_Full.pdf. 
 169. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310–14; Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 
168, at 5–7 (discussing demographics and legal issues facing pregnant and parenting 
minors in foster care). 
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icies, in practice guides for children’s attorneys and guardians ad litem, and 
in the demographic data on children in foster care.”170  An adolescent parent 
who herself was a victim of abuse and neglect remains accountable to the 
same extent as an adult to charges of child abuse or neglect of her child.171  
Yet, the child welfare system does little to ensure that the cycle of abuse does 
not repeat itself.172  Research shows that adolescents in foster care are more 
likely to become teenage parents, and children born to teen mothers are more 
likely to end up in foster care.173  Sarah Katz, a lawyer for parents in depend-
ency cases, describes this double-edged system of “protection”: 
I am startled by how quickly the system turns the tables on young par-
ents, holding them accountable for their lack of independent living 
skills or poor judgment as parents—the very proficiencies that the de-
pendency and delinquency systems are supposed to provide in loco 
parentis.174   
Minor parents in the foster care system are at a particularly high risk of 
having both inadequate access to abortion care, especially in states with pa-
rental involvement mandates, and of losing custody of their infants.175  Alt-
hough there are legal and economic incentives for the child welfare system to 
allow foster children to maintain custody of their infants, child welfare schol-
ars have surfaced ample evidence that, in practice, state officials often ignore 
 
 170. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 61.  For example, one study in New 
York found that the New York City foster care system did not report any data on 
youth in their care who became parents.  See Jill E. Sheppard & Mark A. Woltman, 
Children Raising Children: City Fails to Adequately Assist Pregnant and Parenting 
Youth in Foster Care, PUB. ADVOC. FOR CITY N.Y. 3 (May 2005), http://www.nyc.
gov/html/records/pdf/govpub/2708children_raising_children.pdf. 
 171. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 2–3. 
 172. Id. at 3. 
 173. Alison Stewart Ng & Kelleen Kaye, Why It Matters: Teen Childbearing and 
Child Welfare, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 
(2013), https://thenationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-primary-
download/childbearing-childwelfare.pdf; see also Sarah Katz, When the Child is a 
Parent: Effective Advocacy for Teen Parents in the Child Welfare System, 79 TEMP. 
L. REV. 535, 535–53 (2006) (describing failures of the child welfare system to protect 
the parental rights of minor parents in foster care). 
 174. Katz, supra note 173, at 535; see also Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 
23 (“The pervasiveness of such threats [to remove infants from parenting wards] also 
reflects the foster care system’s readiness to switch alliances as a ward reaches ado-
lescence.  Now that she has a child, the same system that cast the ward as a helpless 
victim is quick to cast her as the enemy.”). 
 175. See Rebouché, supra note 5, at 194–96; NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & 
FAMILIES, supra note 107, at 9; Kara Sheli Walis, Note, No Access, No Choice: Fos-
ter Care Youth, Abortion, and State Removal of Children, 18 CUNY L. REV. 119 
(2014) (discussing difficulties of foster care youth in accessing abortion and maintain-
ing custody of their infants). 
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minors’ parental rights.176  Historically, state agents often viewed parenting 
wards as inherently inadequate parents, and accordingly, they separated in-
fants from their teenage mothers.177  A combination of prejudices based on 
the age, class, and race of parenting wards worked against teenage mothers’ 
rights to maintain custody of their infants.178  Supposedly “voluntary” surren-
ders of infants to foster care or adoption frequently resulted from coercive 
pressures, including lack of financial resources, denial of housing unless the 
minor parent surrendered her legal rights to her infant, and lack of under-
standing of legal rights.179  One commentator observes: 
“[V]oluntary” separation of parenting wards [minor parents in foster 
care] from their children is frequently the result of coercive measures; 
specifically young mothers have been pushed into giving up their 
children because of a lack of available services and funding.  Foster 
care staff may threaten removal of their children, coercing these moth-
ers into following strict rules and into not complaining about inade-
quate care.180 
Stories abound of child welfare workers unjustifiably removing children 
from teenage mothers under the guise of child protection.181  For example, 
due to a shortage of placement availability for mother/child pairs in the foster 
care system, minor parents may suffer unwanted, and sometimes illegal, sepa-
rations from their children.182  In their study of parenting youth in foster care, 
Eve Stotland and Cynthia Godsoe find: 
Most disturbingly, advocates across the country report that states and 
counties frequently violate parenting ward’s due process rights by co-
ercing teens into “voluntarily” placing their child in government cus-
tody, separating wards from their children absent proper judicial find-
 
 176. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 14–25 (discussing policies in four 
states with regard to parenting wards and difficulties parenting wards face in main-
taining custody of their children). 
 177. See Rebecca Bonagura, Redefining the Baseline: Reasonable Efforts, Family 
Preservation, and Parenting Foster Children in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 175, 181 (2008). 
 178. Id. at 179–81. 
 179. See In re C., 607 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015–16 (Fam. Ct. 1994); In re Tricia 
Lashawanda M., 451 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (describing “lightning quick 
maneuvers” used to separate minor parent from her infant immediately after child 
birth). 
 180. Bonagura, supra note 177, at 181–82. 
 181. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 23 (discussing “a problem noted by 
advocates for parenting wards in all of the survey states – threats by foster care staff 
to remove a parenting ward’s child if the parenting ward fails to follow program rules 
or the ward’s service plan, even though the ward’s behavior clearly does not rise to 
the level of abuse or neglect as defined by relevant state law”). 
 182. Id. at 45–46. 
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ings, and threatening to remove infants from wards’ care based on in-
fractions which do not pose an imminent risk of harm to the baby.183   
One study describes the rationale for removal as based on fear of teen-
age girls’ abilities to parent: 
The majority of caseworkers in the foster care system were terrified of 
being blamed for something happening to babies of teen mothers, and 
thus they tended to take the babies and put them in separate homes.  
They didn’t worry that this was against the law, which permitted re-
moval only in cases of imminent risk.  For them imminent risk was 
synonymous with teenage mothers.184 
Although reported cases in this context are few, one striking case illus-
trates the worst (one hopes) of these practices.  In In re Tricia Lashawnda M., 
a family court in New York found that child welfare workers improperly 
sought termination of a teenage girl’s parental rights and had long denied her 
right to be united with her child.185  The mother, Catherine Linda, declared to 
be a neglected child and was placed with the Commissioner of Social Ser-
vices for shelter care prior to her fourteenth birthday.186  The following year, 
she gave birth to her daughter, provoking a series of actions by state officials 
apparently aimed at thwarting her parental rights.187  As the court described, 
“upon being wheeled out of the delivery room, less than a half hour after she 
regained consciousness, and while still under the effects of the anesthetic,” 
Catherine Linda’s own social worker had her sign a “consent” instrument 
surrendering her baby to the agency.188  After a “series of lightning quick 
maneuvers,” Catherine Linda “found herself no longer under the care of this 
agency which had now conveniently taken over her own child as its ward to 
her own exclusion.”189  Even though facilities did exist for co-residence of 
mothers and infants, the child welfare agents chose instead to keep mother 
and child separated.190  The court found that Catherine Linda made numerous 
efforts to maintain a relationship with her daughter and to regain her custody, 
“in spite of every possible obstacle, in spite of the Commissioner’s dismal 
failure to meet his statutory responsibilities to his ward to keep her united 
 
 183. Id. at 61. 
 184. BETSY KREBS & PAUL PITCOFF, BEYOND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM: THE 
FUTURE FOR TEENS 82 (2006); see also Katz, supra note 173, at 536–37 (describing 
case in which minor parent’s child was adjudicated dependent based solely on par-
ent’s status as a minor in foster care by the trial court, a decision which the appeals 
court later overturned). 
 185. In re Tricia Lashawanda M., 451 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (Fam. Ct. 1982). 
 186. See id.  
 187. See id. at 554–56. 
 188. Id. at 554. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. 
41
Manian: Minors, Parents, and Minor Parents
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
168 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
with her child.”191  The court ultimately concluded that the “best interests of 
this infant would appear to be served by uniting her with her mother.”192 
While Catherine Linda’s story may represent an extreme case of mis-
treatment, more recent research on parenting wards describes similar stories 
of the child welfare system’s denial of resources to support minors who wish 
to parent their children – a lack of support that often results in the deprivation 
of parental rights.193  Overall, evidence indicates that minor parents in foster 
care “face an up-hill struggle to maintain custody of their children even where 
no one has accused them of being unfit to parent.”194  In addition, in child 
welfare law generally, and especially with adolescent parenting wards, the 
“overlay of racial bias and economic inequality is impossible to ignore.”195  
When youth in foster care, who are disproportionately poor and racial minori-
ties, “lose their children to the system, the social inequalities that contributed 
to the wards’ initial placement are revisited upon a second generation.”196  
Thus, the child welfare system’s “failure to support parenting wards creates 
foster care ‘legacy’ families, every generation of which is raised in the state-
controlled environment of foster care.”197 
Unwarranted removal of their children remains an ongoing hazard, es-
pecially for minor parents in the foster care system, but teenage parents from 
less marginalized populations still confront similar risks.198  The disabilities 
of minority, such as the inability to form a contract, place minor parents at a 
greater risk of losing their children in a dependency proceeding.199  A number 
of commentators have noted that teenage parents are likely to have their par-
enting more closely scrutinized and are more likely to interact with individu-
als who are mandated reporters of abuse and neglect who may assume that 
 
 191. Id. at 561. 
 192. Id. at 562. 
 193. See, e.g., SHEPPARD & WOLTMAN, supra note 170, at 3 (describing a survey 
that found “a significant number of young women served by the foster care system 
have children and uncovered major lapses in the City services for these young moth-
ers”); ROBERTS, supra note 165, at 87–88 (describing reports of New York City’s 
child welfare agency pressuring teen mothers to give up infants to relieve shortages in 
foster homes); YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., INC., CARING FOR OUR CHILDREN: 
IMPROVING THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM FOR TEEN MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 7–9 
(1995) (on file with author) (describing parenting wards’ struggles while in foster care 
to maintain relationships with their children and prejudices they faced from child 
welfare agents); YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., INC., THE FUTURE FOR TEENS IN FOSTER 
CARE (2001) (on file with author) (discussing foster care system’s focus on control-
ling or punishing parenting wards rather than supporting their futures). 
 194. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 25. 
 195. Id. at 60; see also ROBERTS, supra note 165. 
 196. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 60. 
 197. Id. at 61. 
 198. See Kendra Huard Fershee, A Parent Is a Parent, No Matter How Small, 18 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 425, 427 (2012). 
 199. Id. at 432–33 (2012); Katz, supra note 173, at 544 (discussing how disabili-
ties of minority may negatively affect minor parents’ ability to parent their children). 
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children of minor parents are at risk simply by virtue of the parents’ minori-
ty.200  Once subject to review by child welfare workers, skepticism toward 
girls’ reproductive and parenting decision making drives a tendency to dis-
rupt their parental rights.201 
One other common strain of thought underlies these practices and 
threads through both child welfare and adoption law.202  The common con-
ception that appears to animate resistance to supporting teenagers’ parental 
rights is that termination of a minor parent’s parental rights and placement of 
the infant for adoption will serve the best interests of both children: the minor 
parent and her infant.203  In theory, the minor parent would be free to pursue 
educational and career opportunities, and her child could be raised in a more 
stable home by experienced adults desiring to parent.204  However, evidence 
does not support the contention that, generally speaking, termination of pa-
rental rights results in positive consequences for both the adolescent parent 
and her child.205  Even if it is generally true that children of teenage parents 
do not fare as well as those of adult parents, it does not follow that those chil-
dren will necessarily fare better or even find alternative placements, especial-
ly if parents or state officials coerce removal of the minor parent’s infant.206  
 
 200. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 311–12; Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 
168, at 6–7; Bonagura, supra note 177, at 181–82. 
 201. Katz, supra note 173, at 554 (“Courts, advocates, and social service provid-
ers often assume that the teenager is a per se unfit parent or may bypass the teenager’s 
parental rights simply because of her youth.”). 
 202. Id. at 555. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 816 (noting 
policy reasons for terminating rights of minor parents); Shannon S. Carothers et al., 
Children of Adolescent Mothers: Exposure to Negative Life Events and the Role of 
Social Supports on Their Socioemotional Adjustment, 35 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 
827, 828 (2006) (discussing negative consequences that adolescent parenting has on 
both the minor parent and her child).  It is also true that child welfare law more gener-
ally prioritizes adoption above all other solutions for children in the system.  See 
Godsoe, supra note 155, at 114; ROBERTS, supra note 165. 
 205. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 146. 
 206. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 333–34 (discussing negative aspects of 
termination of parental rights for minor parents); see also Buss, The Parental Rights 
of Minors, supra note 111, at 825–26 (“We know that many children do not fare par-
ticularly well with minor parents, but we do not know how they would fare with oth-
ers, especially if they knew that they were taken from their birth mothers against their 
will.”).  Complicated issues arise when the minor parent, herself a ward of the state, is 
charged with neglect or abuse of her child: 
 
After all, which child do we seek to protect – the struggling teen or vulnerable 
infant?  In many situations, the minor parent’s and child’s interests are aligned 
in remaining together, presenting the possibility of a mutually beneficial out-
come.  Nevertheless, hard cases exist in which the interests of the ward and 
her child clearly diverge. 
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Involuntary removal of a child from his or her parents may have long-term 
negative consequences for both the teenage parent and her infant.207  As Bar-
bara Glesner Fines explains: 
For teen parents, that loss is not less than when adults have their pa-
rental rights terminated.  A relinquishment is not cost free to any par-
ent. . . .  One can presume that the loss is equal if not more profound 
when the parent has her rights terminated.  For teen parents, the loss 
and grief of relinquishing or losing a child is aggravated by the cir-
cumstances of fewer resources to make these decisions and less emo-
tional maturity to cope with the emotional fallout.208 
For a minor parent in foster care who typically has little family other 
than her own children, “[t]he possibility that her child will relive her fate may 
be particularly devastating.”209  Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a mi-
nor parent pressured into giving up her child will have educational or career 
opportunities that will improve her economic circumstances, or that her child 
will find an adoptive placement rather than languish in foster care.210  To the 
 
Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 60.  These situations could be better addressed 
through alternatives to complete termination of parental rights, as discussed further 
infra Part III.B. 
 207. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 333–34 (children removed from teen par-
ents can suffer with life-long identify issues, while the teen parents often also struggle 
with loss of self-worth and identity with profound consequences on future ability to 
parent, resulting in cutting themselves off from various low skill job opportunities 
such as child care and medical assisting); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing nega-
tive consequences to minor parents pressured into giving up their children). 
 208. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 317–18 (quoting Elizabeth J. Samu-
els, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to the Adoption of Their 
Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 529 (2005)) (“Research presents ‘a growing 
body of recent research data which has supported the claims of birth parents that re-
linquishing a child is indeed a profound loss experience, and that this loss even can 
have long-term deleterious results.’  These negative effects can be mitigated with 
‘sufficient resources and support to make an informed and deliberate choice.’”).  “The 
termination of parental rights has been characterized as tantamount to a ‘civil death 
penalty.’”  In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (quoting In re 
N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. App. 2002); In re Parental Rights as to K.D.L., 118 
Nev. 737, 58 P.3d 181, 186 (2002)).  “It is a drastic intrusion into the sacred parent-
child relationship.”  Id. (quoting In re P.C., B.M., & C.M., 62 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2001)). 
 209. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 23.  California passed legislation 
recognizing the unique problems faced by parenting wards and that both children’s 
best interests are served by efforts to keep minor parents and their infants together.  
See S.B. 1178, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2004); see also Bonagura, supra note 177, 
at 226–31 (describing California legislation on rights of parenting wards). 
 210. See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 825–26 (“We 
might also worry whether it is realistic to expect the state to find alternative families 
for babies whose relinquishment is compelled.  This would be a particular concern for 
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contrary, poor and racial minority minor parents and their infants have much 
more limited economic opportunities for stable adoptive placements.211 
Although, in theory, minor parents possess the same rights as adult par-
ents to rear their children, child welfare practices indicate that, in reality, the 
law allows for a deep skepticism toward the rights of minor parents to parent 
their children.212  Particularly for minor parents in foster care, social workers 
and judges “too often take a policing approach toward [parenting wards] that 
is adversarial and punitive, rather than supportive, educational, and preventa-
tive.”213  Yet, “Just as poverty should not be confused with neglect, so too a 
parent’s youth should not be taken as synonymous with an imminent risk of 
harm to their child.”214  Reflecting the problem of under-funding and racial 
and class bias endemic to the child welfare system, the law often responds by 
taking adolescent mothers’ children away from their care, rather than by 
providing needed resources to support their parenting.215   
2.  Minor Parents and Adoption Law 
The child welfare system’s disregard of minors’ parental rights has par-
allels in adoption law.216  Adoption occurs by two methods: (1) the state can 
terminate parental rights based on severe abuse or neglect and place the child 
for adoption, or (2) parents can voluntarily relinquish their child for adop-
 
babies who are members of racial minority groups whose placement prospects are 
generally more limited.”); see also Amanda T. Perez, Transracial Adoption and the 
Federal Adoption Subsidy, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 201, 203 (1998) (describing the 
“severity of the gap in placement rates between minority and non-minority children”). 
 211. See ROBERTS, supra note 165.  See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare’s 
Paradox, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV 881 (2007) (discussing child relocation services in 
a black community and the affect it has on the community and the children); Dorothy 
E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV 171 (2003). 
 212. Bonagura, supra note 177, at 202. 
 213. Id. at 178 (footnote omitted).  Cost savings are another possible motivation 
for the state’s desire to pressure minor parents to relinquish their infants for adoption, 
in order for the state to have one less minor to support and in line with the theory that 
family law seeks to “privatize dependency.”  See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Divorce 
Bargain: The Father’s Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 
(2016) (describing the law’s push in both private and public family law domains to 
privatize dependency). 
 214. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 326. 
 215. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 170; ROBERTS, supra note 165; Bonagura, 
supra note 177, at 176 (“The complicated reality behind these numbers [of higher 
rates of pregnancy and foster care for parenting wards] is that because of state failure 
to provide the placements, services, and support necessary to function successfully as 
a family, parenting wards and their children are often denied the opportunity to re-
main together.”); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1998). 
 216. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 153–54. 
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tion.217  Strikingly, there are generally no special protections for minor par-
ents in either circumstance; most state laws treat adult parents and minor par-
ents exactly the same in rules for involuntary termination and voluntary relin-
quishment.218  Abortion opponents often present adoption as the better alter-
native to abortion, but research on the adoption of minor parents’ infants pre-
sents a troubling picture of unwarranted terminations of parental rights, less-
than-voluntary relinquishments, and difficulty finding placements for racial 
minority children. 
The first method of adoption – the involuntary termination of parental 
rights – arises in the context of a child welfare dependency proceeding, such 
as a child abuse or neglect case.219  As discussed previously, in many cases, 
the child welfare system’s failure to adequately support minor parents leads 
to a higher incidence of adolescent parents being charged with abuse or ne-
glect and a higher risk of losing their infant, either through an involuntary 
termination proceeding or through pressure to “voluntarily” relinquish their 
child.220 
The second method of adoptive placement – voluntary relinquishment or 
“surrender” of a child – also raises special concerns in the context of adoles-
cent parenting.  In addition to those minors whose parental rights are at risk 
for termination by the child welfare system, “5% of teen birth mothers af-
firmatively relinquish their children for adoption.”221  The overall picture of 
voluntary relinquishment by minor parents remains quite murky because 
“[t]hese processes of relinquishment are less visible, with less certain rights 
to representation, than involuntary termination processes.”222  Moreover, 
“The degree to which these mothers’ decisions are voluntary is difficult to 
assess.”223  As described in Part II.B.1, evidence from the child welfare con-
text suggests that parenting wards may be coerced into “voluntarily” surren-
dering their children, sometimes due to a lack of services.224  While child 
welfare law disproportionately impacts poor minority parents, adoption law 
practices, both historically and with modern day revocation rules, suggest that 
even less marginalized groups of adolescent mothers remain subject to dis-
dain for their parental rights.  Revocation case law, discussed further below, 
 
 217. See Tracey B. Harding, Note, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: 
Reform is Needed, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 895, 895 (2001). 
 218. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 129. 
 219. See Karl A.W. Demarce, Note, Stepparent Adoption and Involuntary Termi-
nation of Parental Rights: When Petitioners Come to Court with Unclean Hands, 61 
MO. L. REV. 995, 1000–01 (1996). 
 220. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310. 
 221. Id. at 313. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (“Programs, parents, and even potential adoptive parents may create sub-
tle or overt pressures for voluntary relinquishment.”). 
 224. See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 61; In re C., 607 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 
1015–16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) (discussing ways in which parenting wards may be 
coerced into “voluntarily” relinquishing their infants). 
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indicates that some teenage mothers “voluntarily” relinquish their infants as a 
result of pressure from their own family, adoptive families and agencies, or 
state officials, and these mothers face extreme difficulties getting their infants 
back when they wish to set aside their consent to the adoption. 
For the most part, state law governs adoption, and therefore, technical 
requirements vary. In a traditional or “closed” adoption, adoption terminates 
all legal and social contact between a child and his or her biological family.225  
The move to “open” adoption in the United States has shifted this practice 
somewhat, because open adoptions allow varying degrees of ongoing social 
contact between the adopted child and his or her biological family.226  How-
ever, open adoptions still sever the legal parental tie between the biological 
parents and their child, and moreover, agreements for ongoing contact with 
the birth parents may not be enforceable.227  Adoption requires the consent of 
both parents to relinquish the child and terminate parental rights or, alterna-
tively, proof that a parent is unfit in an involuntary termination proceeding.  
Consent to adoption is generally irrevocable, with a few statutory exceptions 
examined further below.228 
Typically, due to the permanence of terminating parental rights and “a 
veneration for the maternal-child bond,” state law extensively regulates the 
timing, procedures, and formal requirements for birth mother relinquishment 
to ensure that consent is voluntary.229  Generally, adoption statutes require a 
biological parent’s written consent to relinquish the child and that the consent 
be made before a third party, such as a judge, notary, or other disinterested 
witness.230  Rules for the timing and revocation of consent vary among the 
states, but generally, consent cannot be revoked outside of the established 
time window unless the biological parent proves fraud or duress.231 
Almost every state provides that maternal consent for adoption cannot 
be given until after the birth of the child, and a number of states prescribe the 
number of hours or days that must pass after the child’s birth before the 
 
 225. See Jessica R. Caterina, Note, Glorious Bastards: The Legal and Civil Birth-
right of Adoptees to Access Their Medical Records in Search of Genetic Identity, 61 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 145, 150 (2010). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Leigh Gaddie, Open Adoption, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 499, 501 
(2009) (discussing the current status and development of open adoption law in the 
United Stated); see also Annette Ruth Appell, Reflections on the Movement Toward a 
More Child-Centered Adoption, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 228. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 72. 
 229. Id.  See Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[2]. 
 230. See, e.g., Mary M. Beck, Adoption of Children in Missouri, 63 MO. L. REV. 
423, 450 (1998). 
 231. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 72; Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.12 
(citing Katherine G. Thompson & Joan H. Hollinger, Contested Adoptions: Strategy 
of the Case, in 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02[1][a]–[b] (Joan H. Hollinger 
ed., 2013)). 
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mother can give a valid consent.232  A few states provide additional protec-
tions to ensure the validity of the biological parents’ consent.  For example, 
Michigan does not allow a biological parent to grant consent for adoption 
until an investigation occurs and a judge fully explains her rights to the par-
ent.233  In Colorado, a parent must receive counseling before consenting to 
adoption.234 
Few states limit the ability of a minor parent to consent to her child’s 
adoption.235  A small number of states require either a minor mother’s parents 
to consent to or a judge to approve the surrender of her parental rights.236  
Other than a limited number of exceptions, most states’ adoption laws either 
explicitly provide that the minority status of a parent does not affect her com-
petency to consent or make no mention of treating minor parents different-
ly.237  In sum, “with near uniformity, adoption law reinforces the autonomy of 
a minor’s decision to finally and irrevocably relinquish a child,” ignoring the 
developmental conditions of youth that courts so emphasize in the abortion 
context.238 
A number of commentators have argued that the differential treatment 
of abortion and adoption highlights the law’s disfavor of abortion.239  Unlike 
STI treatment or pregnancy-related care, adoption generally does not involve 
a medical situation posing physical health risks to the pregnant minor or her 
child that would justify eliminating the general requirement of parental con-
sent.240  Given the recognition that parents have a strong interest in involve-
 
 232. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73; Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 
2.11[1][a] (noting that typical times for consent after birth are twelve, forty-eight, or 
seventy-two hours after childbirth or ten days after childbirth); see also State Statuto-
ry Provisions Relating to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 
79, at §§ 1-A.01–1-A.51 (state by state summary of the time at which consents may be 
executed and at the time of which consents become irrevocable). 
 233. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.44 
(West 2016); see also State Statutory Provisions Relating to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION 
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 79, at § 1-A.23. 
 234. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73; see also State Statutory Provisions 
Relating to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 79, at § 1-A.09. 
 235. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 72; Seymore, supra note 160, at 129–33 
(summarizing state laws on minor parents and adoption relinquishment). 
 236. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 77. 
 239. See, e.g., id. at 69 (“The disparities between the legal treatment of adults and 
minors are highlighted when a pregnancy occurs, when one choice (adoption) elevates 
a minor’s legal status to that of an adult, while another choice (abortion) treats the 
minor as a child whose decision is subject to parental or judicial approval.”). 
 240. Id. at 77.  It is possible that requiring parental consent or notice prior to a 
minor parent’s decision to relinquish a child for adoption could delay the adoption, 
and states generally have a policy of ensuring that adoption occurs speedily after the 
birth of a child.  However, most states impose parental consent or notice requirements 
for minors’ abortion care despite evidence that delays in accessing abortion care can 
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ment with their minor child’s decision to have an abortion, surely parents also 
have a strong interest in a minor child’s decision to give up her child – their 
grandchild – for adoption.  Relinquishment of a child is a major life decision 
that leads to cutting off all ties with blood relatives in a closed adoption, and 
it may cause deep regret in some birth parents.241  Minor unwed mothers may 
especially be subject to inappropriate pressures to relinquish their infants for 
adoption and may need additional support through the decision-making pro-
cess.242  Yet, the possibility of youthful regret does not limit a minor parent’s 
decision to relinquish her infant for adoption.  In fact,  
 
[R]egardless of whether a state’s adoption statute mentions minor 
birth mothers, the general rule is that the minority of a birth parent 
will not free her from the consequences of her relinquishment, alt-
 
also have negative health consequences.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text 
(citing references to evidence on harms of delayed access to abortion care).  Regard-
ing states’ interest in securing speedy adoption, courts have upheld laws that limit the 
rights of unwed fathers to prevent mothers from giving up their child for adoption 
against constitutional challenge based on the need for timely adoptions.  See Mary L. 
Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and 
the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 82–83 (1995) (discussing case 
law limiting rights of unwed fathers to prevent adoption of their children).  Statutes 
offering extremely limited parental rights to unwed fathers in the adoption context 
have been upheld as serving the important state interest in expediting the secure adop-
tion of children.  See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256, 262 
(Neb. 2001).  State courts addressing the rights of unwed fathers in the adoption con-
text have emphasized that the “immediate secure adoption of children is an important 
state interest,” which is best served by “the placement of children as soon after birth 
as possible.”  Id. at 265; see also Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984), abrogated on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.S., 358 P.3d 1009 
(Utah 2014).  The parents of minor unwed fathers also have no right to notice that 
their grandchild may be given up for adoption by the unwed mother, even if the result 
is termination of parental rights to the child.  See In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635 
N.W.2d at 266 (noting that the adoption statutes governing unwed father’s rights do 
not require notice to be served on parents of a minor unwed father).  Hollinger ex-
plains that rules on consent are always balancing tension between wanting valid con-
sent and wanting speedy adoption.  Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[1][a] (“The 
legal rules on the timing of consents are ultimately a compromise between the interest 
in protecting biological mothers from making hasty or ill-informed decisions at a time 
of great physical and emotional stress, and the interest in expediting the adoption 
process for newborns.”). 
 241. See Shanley, supra note 240, at 96–97 (describing cases where bio-mom 
regretted her decision to relinquish her child for adoption and voided adoption years 
later with help from bio-dad whose rights were not properly terminated). 
 242. See Susan Frelich Appleton & Robert A. Pollak, Exploring the Connections 
Between Adoption and IVF: Twibling Analyses, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 60, 64 
(2011) (footnote omitted) (“[W]e can find in the case law and literature on domestic 
adoption reasons to question the voluntariness of birth parents’ consent to adoption, 
especially when the parent is a young, sexually active female or an unmarried fa-
ther.”). 
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hough had the same young woman entered into a commercial contract, 
she could void it at any time.243 
 
Thus, despite similar sets of interests at stake in a minor’s decision to 
terminate her pregnancy or to terminate her parental rights through adoption, 
the law mandates parental or judicial consent only when a teenager chooses 
abortion.244  However, this apparent contrast on the surface of the law masks 
the similar underlying motivations and parallel effects of these legal rules.  A 
closer study of adoption law reveals two key similarities in both the rules 
denying autonomy to girls seeking abortion and granting autonomy to girls 
relinquishing their infant for adoption.  First, both areas of law evince skepti-
cism toward adolescent girls’ reproductive decision making, whether they 
seek to terminate a pregnancy or to carry it to term.   Second, in practice, both 
areas of law operate as a means to punish teenage girls who transgress sexual 
purity norms.  I aim to emphasize here not the superficial conflicts in the law, 
but the deeper similarities in these legal rules that scholars have tended to 
overlook.  Although in some cases, adoption law likely protects the interests 
of minor parents who have good reasons to relinquish their infants for adop-
tion, in other cases, the grant of “rights” to minor parents to surrender their 
infants serves to undermine rather than protect minor parents’ parental 
rights.245  The case law on revocation of consent illustrates this point. 
All states have promulgated statutory rules for revocation of consent, 
but states take a variety of approaches to revocation.246  Revocation generally 
depends on timing and whether the consent was taken in court or extra-
judicially.247  Notably, “[A] mother’s minority is not a per se ground for rev-
 
 243. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74; Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 
231, at § 8.02 [1][b]. 
 244. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 76–77. 
 245. See Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 326. 
 246. Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02 [1][a]. 
 247. Id. at § 8.02 [1][a][i].  Some states give explicit time frames during which 
revocation is permitted.  Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73.  Others allow revoca-
tion only if the biological parent proves that consent was obtained through fraud or 
duress.  Id.  Some states explicitly require that consent conform strictly to statutory 
guidelines and, thus, allow revocation for deviation from the statutory guidelines.  Id.  
Yet others allow revocation only if it serves the best interests of the child placed for 
adoption.  Id. at 73–74; see also Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02 
[1][a][i] & n.18; CAL. FAM. CODE § 9005(d) (West 2016) (“If the court finds that 
withdrawal of the consent to adoption is reasonable in view of all the circumstances 
and that withdrawal of the consent is in the child’s best interest, the court shall ap-
prove the withdrawal of the consent.  Otherwise the court shall withhold its approv-
al.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2(f) (West 2016) (“A consent to adoption . . . may not 
be withdrawn . . . without . . . a written finding that such action will be for the best 
interests of the individual to be adopted.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(b) 
(McKinney 2016) (“[T]he court . . . has determined that the best interests of the child 
will be served by giving force and effect to such revocation.”). 
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ocation of consent, even before the completion of the adoption.”248  As men-
tioned above, this means that the minority of a birth mother is not grounds for 
revocation of her consent, even though under the infancy doctrine, she could 
revoke a commercial contract.  Although courts may take into account the 
birth mother’s minority in assessing the voluntariness of her consent, the ma-
jority of reported decisions reject revocation on the basis of the birth mother’s 
minority.249  Courts tend to rely on an analysis focusing on the best interests 
of the adopted child, and courts tend to conclude that the mother’s minority 
weighs against revocation because, based on her age, the court assumes that 
she cannot adequately care for the child.250  A few cases have permitted revo-
cation but primarily because the court found that revocation served the best 
interests of the prospective adoptee rather than based on the minor birth 
mother’s vulnerability.251  In the abortion context, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally relied on notions of minors’ presumed immaturity and vulnerability as 
justifications for requiring either parental or judicial approval of the minor’s 
decision to seek abortion care.252  Yet, courts generally have not considered 
what this analysis means for minor parents’ voluntary relinquishment of their 
children for adoption.253 
 
 248. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74; Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 
231, at § 8.02 [1][a][i]. 
 249. See Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02[1][A][ii][b] nn.52–53; 
see, e.g., Kathy O. v. Counseling & Family Servs., 438 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1982) (fifteen-year-old parent’s consent to adoption was not revocable based on mi-
nority). 
 250. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74.  See Thompson & Hollinger, supra 
note 231, at § 8.02; see, e.g., Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955) (natural 
mother was considered “still very young [,] . . . not married and is untrained in any 
kind of work” in determining the order of adoption was valid); In re Duarte’s Adop-
tion, 229 Cal. App. 2d 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (denying a fourteen-year-old moth-
er’s request to revoke her consent to a private adoption, even where the child was 
later legitimized by the natural mother marrying natural father); In re Adoption of 
Baby C., 480 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1984) (natural mother’s minor age considered in deter-
mining that natural parents were totally unprepared for child rearing and withdrawal 
of consent for adoption was not invalidated). 
 251. See Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74; Thompson & Hollinger, supra 
note 231, at § 8.02[1][a][i].  See, e.g., Graves v. Graves, 288 So. 2d 142 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1973) (holding that the best interest of the child is served by returning her to her 
mother and revoking the consent of adoption to the grandparents even when there is 
no duress, fraud, or coercion at time of consent); In re D., 408 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1966) (finding that it was in the best interest of two daughters to withdraw con-
sent to adoption by grandparents but no duress, fraud, or coercion found).  But see 
Janet G. v. N.Y. Foundling Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (permit-
ting a minor mother’s revocation of consent based on evidence that the mother had 
not voluntarily, informingly, and knowingly surrendered her child for adoption, and 
noting the special vulnerability minors experience when making important decisions). 
 252. See Bellotti v. Baird (Belotti II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
 253. See Appleton, supra note 11, at 282; Seymore, supra note 160, at 154–55.  
Courts also give short shrift to minor fathers’ interests in the adoption of their chil-
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So why declare minors to be immature for purposes of abortion consent, 
but mature for purposes of adoption consent?  First, as in child welfare law, a 
skeptical view of an adolescent’s decision to become a teenage parent drives 
the law, in practice.  Scholars suspect that the belief that adolescent parents 
should not exercise the right to parent their children explains why the law 
treats minor birth parents like adults rather than like children within the adop-
tion context.254 Expanding minors’ rights by permitting them to consent to 
their infants’ adoptions ensures easier enforcement of supposedly voluntary 
relinquishments, even in questionable circumstances. Cases in which birth 
mothers have lost their attempts to revoke their consent, while only offering a 
limited window into voluntary relinquishments, are illuminating here.255 
One adoption revocation case, decided prior to Roe v. Wade,256 openly 
articulates this rationale – that unmarried minor girls should not possess pa-
rental rights.257  In many cases, however, this pernicious purpose for denying 
minor parents’ parental rights remains hidden from view.  In 1955, an Arkan-
sas court refused to allow a sixteen-year-old birth mother, Katherine, to set 
aside her consent to adoption of her infant.258  Katherine had granted consent 
for the adoption two days after giving birth and changed her mind only four 
months thereafter, prior to a final adoption decree.259  The facts also suggest-
ed that Katherine’s physician pressured her into relinquishing her baby for 
adoption based on her age, poverty, and the shame surrounding the infants’ 
illegitimacy and her sexual behavior.260  The court rejected revocation of 
consent on the ground that allowing the adoption to stand would serve the 
best interests of both Katherine and her infant.261  The court emphasized that 
without her baby, the teenage mother “could lead a normal life” and would 
not have to face her small town “where everyone in the community would 
know of her plight.”262  As Professors Durcan and Appell note, the court 
 
dren.  See In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026 (Utah 2010) (assuming the responsi-
bilities of parenthood does not give a putative father a constitutionally protected right 
to consent to the adoption of his child); see also Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.05. 
 254. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 75 (arguing that the desire to make it 
easier to remove infants from teenage parents’ care is perhaps the rationale behind 
treating minor birth parents like adults and not children in adoption cases). 
 255. See Samuels, supra note 208, at 571 (noting that revocation case law pro-
vides a window into voluntariness of consent for adoption and reviewing case law 
where mothers’ sought to set aside their relinquishments). 
 256. 410 U.S. 113 (1793). 
 257. Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955). 
 258. Id. at 844–45. 
 259. Id. at 844. 
 260. See id. at 843–44, 846 (stating that doctor suggested adoption given Kathe-
rine’s circumstances, arranged for adoption with an infertile couple that he knew, and 
offered her free medical care “for the purpose of influencing the decision she later 
made”). 
 261. Id. at 845. 
 262. Id. 
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“substituted its judgment of what was in the mother’s best interest for her 
own assessment, giving rise to the apparent anomaly that the same minor is 
mature enough to decide to relinquish her baby, but not to decide to keep the 
child.”263  A number of other revocation cases also imply skepticism toward 
adolescent girls’ decisions to parent their infants, and such cases enforce the 
normative view that minor parents should not possess parental rights.264 
Second, not only does the apparent expansion of adolescent rights with-
in the adoption context serve to undermine minor parents’ parental rights in 
some cases, but revocation case law also reveals that granting minor parents 
an unfettered “right” to relinquish provides a means to punish teenage female 
transgression of sexual mores.  Susan Frelich Appleton conducted an exten-
sive and fascinating study of reproduction and regret in the law with some 
particularly poignant insights into the law of relinquishment and revoca-
tion.265  Professor Appleton notes that adoption law and practice have long 
treated unmarried mothers as deviant and, hence, unfit to parent.266  Several 
authors have recounted the long history of narratives of trauma and regret for 
women pressured or forced to give up their infants for adoption in the pre-
Roe era, particularly white mothers who could meet the demand for white 
babies from infertile couples.267  This narrative continues to some extent to-
day, most strikingly, in cases involving young birth mothers’ attempts at rev-
ocation. 
For example, in a recent case from the Mississippi Supreme Court, In re 
Adoption of D.N.T., the court declined to let a seventeen-year-old birth moth-
er reclaim her baby, despite a troubling set of facts that the dissent character-
ized as “coercion” of the birth mother.268  The birth mother, Camille, changed 
her mind about the adoption only two weeks after signing her consent and 
after almost two years of raising her daughter.  Camille consented to the 
adoption while she was living with the adoptive couple who, evidence 
 
 263. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 75. 
 264. See cases cited infra notes 274–78.  The push to privatize dependency may 
also provide an additional explanation for the urge to have minor parents relinquish 
their infants if courts are generally skeptical that minors can financially support an 
infant and believe that minor mothers would be more capable of self-support upon 
relinquishment. 
 265. Appleton, supra note 11, at 255. 
 266. Id. at 275. 
 267. Id.; see also ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES 
BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2006); RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE 
POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 69–70 (2001).  It is important to note that the law has differed significantly in 
its treatment of white single mothers versus women of color.  See generally Roberts, 
supra note 211.  Women of color have long been viewed as inherently deviant and 
often face different kinds of challenges to their parental rights.  See generally id. (ad-
dressing child relocation services in black communities). 
 268. In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 2003). 
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showed, had pressured her to sign the adoption papers without having her 
own lawyer or consulting with her own mother who had helped her raise her 
daughter.  The evidence showed that Camille believed she would have con-
tinued contact with her daughter, which the adopting couple denied almost 
immediately post-adoption.  Camille’s mother joined her in the suit to revoke 
Camille’s consent and nullify the adoption.269 
Despite these compelling facts, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled 
against Camille and her mother in a revealing opinion.  To justify its decision, 
the court used several different tactics, including relying on “the state adop-
tion consent statute that makes the parent’s age irrelevant, construing Ca-
mille’s initial surrender as an abandonment sufficient to justify termination of 
parental rights and condemning Camille’s bad decisions and immaturity, in-
cluding . . . her sexual relationship with her new boyfriend.”270  Notably, the 
court relied on the lower court’s logic that when Camille gave birth, she be-
came a parent and thus achieved emancipation.271  In response to Camille’s 
contention that because minors must obtain parental or judicial consent for 
abortion, the same should apply for adoption, the court replied: 
A minor who is contemplating an abortion has not yet become a par-
ent and there is a clear distinction in the law between the way a minor 
child contemplating an abortion is treated and the way that a minor 
child contemplating an adoption is considered and it’s the fact of that 
child’s parenthood that makes that decision different.272 
In other words, when Camille gave birth, she achieved the status of par-
ent, and thus, as described in Part II.A, the court superficially treated her like 
an adult in her decisions about her child, in theory “respecting” her parental 
rights.  Yet, at the same time the court asserted that Camille should be treated 
like an adult parent and held to her decision to relinquish, it also emphasized 
Camille’s “immature” behavior, particularly her sexual behavior, which the 
court gave as a reason that she should not continue to parent her daughter.273  
The D.N.T. court’s rigidly formalistic analysis presents a striking example of 
how courts can apply both the parent and child categories at the same time to 
minor parents, but in a punitive rather than supportive manner.  Because of 
her formal status as “parent,” the court deems Camille to be mature enough to 
 
 269. Id. at 695–96. 
 270. Appleton, supra note 11, at 279.  See In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d at 
708. 
 271. See In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d at 709–10; Appleton, supra note 11, 
at 282. 
 272. See In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d at 709. 
 273. Id. (“The record is replete with bad decisions Camille has made her entire 
life.  She has proven herself immature beyond understanding, as evidenced adequate-
ly by her own testimony of leaving [the baby] with almost strangers . . . while she 
spent the nights at her new boyfriend’s house having sex and smoking marihuana 
with him.”). 
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consent to adoption, but by virtue of her age and sexual behavior, also deems 
her too immature to parent her child.  Other courts have engaged in strikingly 
similar analyses in revocation cases.274 
As Professor Appleton explains, although today most unmarried moth-
ers who choose to give birth also choose to keep their child, “one still sees 
stories of deep and anguished regret in reported cases of attempted revoca-
tions of adoption plans.”275  Yet, birth mothers typically can only prevail in a 
revocation case when they can prove coercion or duress, and many courts 
have set a high legal threshold to establish such a finding.276  For example, 
 
 274. See, e.g., Fowler v. Merkle, 564 So. 2d 960, 96–62 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) 
(denying revocation of consent); Kayla P. v. Morgan C., No. 1 CA-JV 09-0190, 2010 
WL 987071 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Kathy O. v. Counseling & Family Servs., 438 
N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (fifteen-year-old parent’s consent to adoption was not 
revocable based on minority); In re Minor Child David, 256 A.2d 583, 587–88 (Me. 
1969); Grafe v. Olds, 556 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 1990) (denying revocation of consent 
during period of placement of child with prospective parents and entry of adoption 
decree); In re Adoption of A.D.A., 789 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (denying 
revocation of consent); In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); 
In re Adoption of J.H., No. 06CA008902, 2006 WL 3257525, at *1, *4 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 13, 2006) (denying withdrawal of consent by seventeen-year-old); In re 
Adoption of Morrison, 560 P.2d 240 (Okla. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that consent 
executed by sixteen-year-old mother is effective even though she did not have counsel 
or guardian ad litem and opining that requirement of court approval adequately pro-
tected minor parents); Sigurdson v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Serv. (In re De-
pendency of M.S.), 236 P.3d 214, 218 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting In re Adoption 
of Baby Girl K., 615 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)).  But see Ex parte Sul-
livan, 407 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1981) (returning child to seventeen-year-old birth mother 
even after passage of significant period of time due to failure to follow statutory re-
quirements of adoption consent); A.F. v. Spence-Chapin Agency, 537 N.Y.S.2d 752 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (questioning whether minor father’s consent to adoption was 
voluntary but nevertheless concluding that father’s consent was not required); Janet 
G. v. Foundling Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (permitting minor 
mother’s revocation of consent based on evidence that mother had not voluntarily, 
informingly, and knowingly surrendered her child for adoption, and noting the special 
vulnerability minors experience when making important decisions); see also Gary D. 
Spivey, Annotation, What Constitutes “Duress” in Obtaining Parent’s Consent to 
Adoption of Child or Surrender of Child to Adoption Agency, 74 A.L.R.3D 527 
(1976); Jack W. Shaw, Annotation, What Constitutes Undue Influence in Obtaining A 
Parent’s Consent to Adoption of Child, 50 A.L.R.3D 918 (1973). 
 275. Appleton, supra note 11, at 281. 
 276. Id.  Whether there has been sufficient fraud or duress to warrant revoking a 
birth parent’s consent is left up to the discretion of the courts.  See Thompson & Hol-
linger, supra note 231, at § 8.02[1][b].  “Generally, . . . a challenge will not be permit-
ted for duress of circumstances, or for what some courts refer to as a mere ‘transient 
situational disturbance,’ particularly if an adoptive placement has already been 
made.”  Id.  See In re Baby Boy R., 386 S.E.2d 839 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that 
mother who signed voluntary relinquishment in hospital before a social worker and 
notary, after being told about significance of her actions, cannot revoke her consent 
for mere “duress of circumstances”).  For example, a teenage mother in Florida con-
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one court openly declared, “‘proof of inexperience, indecisiveness, uncertain-
ty, emotional stress and a failure to fully comprehend the effect of surrender’ 
is insufficient to justify revocation.”277  Thus, “Even when circumstances 
raise serious questions about the voluntariness of the initial consent or sur-
render – as in D.N.T., when the birth mother is a minor and especially eager 
prospective adopters have exploited her vulnerabilities – simple regret, no 
matter how intensely felt, typically fails to carry the day in court.”278  Profes-
sor Appleton shows that the adoption case law and literature “suggest that 
 
sented to a private placement without the use of an adoption agency or the statutorily 
required pre-consent interview by an adoption entity.  J.S. v. S.A., 912 So. 2d 650, 
656–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  Nevertheless, the court upheld the consent alt-
hough the reliability was “open to grave question” and the third party’s conduct was 
possibly criminal.  Id. at 659.  The record also showed that the mother’s consent re-
sulted from social and financial pressures, which the court held did not amount to 
fraud or duress.  Id.  “Neither emotional distress nor mistake of fact will ordinarily 
constitute a sufficient ground to vitiate a consent to an adoption.”  Thompson & Hol-
linger, supra note 231, at § 8.02. 
 277. In re Dependency of M.S., 236 P.3d at 218 (alteration in original) (quoting In 
re Adoption of Baby Girl K., 615 P.2d at 1310).  See In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d 
at 707 (citations omitted) (“It has also been recognized, in this regard, that sugges-
tions, persuasion, arguments or entreaties in favor of adoption do not constitute the 
‘kind of force’ which would sustain a finding of duress and thereby warrant the vaca-
tur of a natural parent’s consent to an adoption.  Thus, parental threats, pressure by 
the surrendering mother’s family, advice by the surrendering parent’s physician and 
mother, and emotional distress or depression have all been cited as insufficient to 
overturn a consent to the surrender of a child for adoption.”); In re Adoption of Baby 
Girl K., 615 P.2d at 1315 (“We hold that a lack of full understanding of the conse-
quences, coupled with inexperience, emotional stress, uncertainty and indecisiveness 
are insufficient findings to allow repudiation of the surrender.”); see also Appleton, 
supra note 11, at 281–82 (discussing adoption revocation cases). 
 278. Appleton, supra note 11, at 281; see also Kayla P., 2010 WL 987071 (juve-
nile mother failed to prove undue influence and duress when giving consent even 
though she claimed to have not fully read or understood the adoption papers in adop-
tive parents’ attorney’s office and was not independently represented by counsel); In 
re Minor Child David, 256 A.2d at 587–88 (“We conclude that the execution of the 
surrender-release is, when all statutory requirements have been met, a completed act 
of solemn import, irrevocable by the mother . . . .  We arrive at this conclusion fully 
aware of the probability that some mothers, experiencing the pain of actual separation 
from their children, may regret their surrender even though it was arrived at after 
careful deliberation.”); In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d 706 (consent forms were not 
executed under duress even though seventeen-year-old minor’s mother told her she 
would no longer be able to live at home if she kept the baby); ROBERTS, supra note 
165 (discussing the frequency of state interventions in minority families, often includ-
ing pressure to “voluntarily” terminate parental rights); Mary Lyndon Shanley, To-
ward New Understandings of Adoption: Individuals and Relationships in Transracial 
and Open Adoption, in NOMOS XLIV: CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 15, 38 (Stephen 
Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 2003). 
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regret has no legal traction because the initial requirement of voluntary con-
sent itself receives only lip service, as illustrated by D.N.T.”279 
Strikingly, the revocation cases from private adoption law echo the simi-
larly facile dispatch of voluntary consent requirements in child welfare 
law.280  While child welfare law disproportionately impacts racial minority 
families and doubly impacts minority adolescent parents within the system, 
adoption practices appear to undermine the parental rights of white adolescent 
mothers as well.281  Comparing these two areas of law demonstrates that, as a 
whole, the law in practice resists granting minors the right to parent their 
children, even though in theory minors possess the same parental rights as 
adults. 
Comparing adoption law to abortion law also yields interesting insights.  
The courts’ treatment of regret in adoption law bears a striking contrast to the 
use of regret in abortion cases.282  In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court 
“makes generalizations about women’s post-abortion regret legally relevant” 
and deploys the Court’s conception of abortion regret as a method for “re-
proaching” non-normative women.283  However, in the adoption context, 
women’s (or girls’) post-surrender regret “often carries no such legal 
weight.”284  Instead, courts treat the pain of regret as “well-deserved punish-
ment for women who have transgressed prevailing sexual norms.”285  As Pro-
fessor Appleton persuasively argues, “[A]doption practice and case law often 
treat regret as a regulatory device, part of the price of illicit sex and also the 
start of the road to redemption.”286  The law’s deployment of regret in this 
manner fits within traditional gender scripts and family law’s preoccupation 
with sexual discipline.287 
The upshot is that the “right” of minor parents to relinquish their chil-
dren for adoption serves the interest, in some cases, of denying the minor her 
rights and imposing a kind of punishment for her sexual transgressions, simi-
 
 279. Appleton, supra note 11, at 281.  “Surely, Camille’s status as a minor and the 
surrounding circumstances raise significant questions about the voluntariness and 
genuineness of her consent, questions the dissenting judges would find fatal.”  Id. at 
281. 
 280. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 281. See generally FESSLER, supra note 267. 
 282. Appleton, supra note 11, at 280 (“Despite the similar settings, however, the 
legal responses to assertions of regret diverge sharply in the context of abortion, on 
one hand, and adoption, on the other.”). 
 283. Id. (“[N]o legal authority has suggested, parallel to Gonzales’s reasoning, 
that prospective regret ought to preclude altogether particular options for birth par-
ents, namely surrender, even if certain anti-adoption support groups might embrace 
this preference.”).  See generally SOLINGER, supra note 267, at 103–38 (describing 
anti-adoption advocacy of Concerned United Birthparents (CUB)). 
 284. Appleton, supra note 11, at 280. 
 285. Id. at 282–83. 
 286. Id. at 283. 
 287. Id. at 323–32. 
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larly to judicial bypass in the abortion context.288   The conflicts in the law on 
adolescent adoption versus abortion lie at the surface while at a deeper level, 
the conflicting rules serve similar latent purposes: expressing skepticism to-
ward adolescents’ reproductive decision making and punishing teenage girls’ 
deviations from sexual purity norms. 
Other scholars have noted that the conflicting rules on adoption and 
abortion appear to be motivated not by “any unified theory of child develop-
ment, the protection of pregnant teenagers, or the nature and long term effects 
of the decisions,” but instead by societal policies, including “the promotion of 
live births and control of minors’ sexuality.”289  As currently structured, the 
law both thwarts minors’ access to abortion on the basis that adolescent girls 
are too immature to make important reproductive decisions on their own, and 
undermines minors’ parental rights on the basis that adolescent girls are not 
mature enough to parent their children.  A closer study of adolescents’ repro-
ductive rights thus demonstrates that both aspects of the law – the law on 
abortion rights and parental rights – work in tandem to enforce traditional 
gender scripts about sexuality and motherhood.290  In particular, the law rein-
forces the notion that a self-sacrificing young mother should give birth and 
surrender her child for adoption – no matter the emotional costs – as a means 
to redemption for her sexually irresponsible behavior. 
* * * 
As the analysis in Part II illustrates, there is a striking difference be-
tween the rights of minor parents in theory and in reality.  A superficial re-
view of the law on adolescent reproduction suggests conflict and incoherence, 
restricting teenage girls’ access to abortion while allowing unfettered rights 
over childbirth and parenting.  A closer look at the reality of minor parents’ 
parental rights unmasks a perverse coherence to the law.  Both abortion law 
and family law take a highly skeptical view of adolescents’ rights to make 
reproductive decisions, and in practice, the law operates as a means to punish 
sexual transgression and enforce traditional gender norms.  The judicial by-
pass system for abortion, the child welfare system, and adoption practices 
undermine adolescents’ reproductive rights, whichever path of pregnancy 
 
 288. See generally Sanger, Separating from Children, supra note 11 (describing 
marginalization of birth mothers in adoption practice). 
 289. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 77; see also Oberman, Turning Girls Into 
Women, supra note 67, at 22; J. Shoshonna Ehrlich, Journey Through the Courts: 
Minor Abortion and the Quest for Reproductive Fairness, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
1, 2 (1998). 
 290. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 409, 414 (2013) (arguing that rejection of “the idea that women would re-
nounce motherhood given the opportunity to embrace it” drives feelings of abortion 
disgust). 
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resolution they choose.291  Each of these systems of law claims to serve chil-
dren’s best interests.  Instead, in too many cases, the law merely inflicts 
shame and punishment, rather than ensuring sound adolescent decision mak-
ing and a path to well-being for both generations of children. 
III.  A THIRD WAY: THIRD PARTY SUPPORT FOR PREGNANT OR 
PARENTING ADOLESCENTS 
So what are we to do given the law’s suspicion of teenage girls who 
transgress sexual norms and end up pregnant or parenting?  It may be that 
pregnant or parenting adolescents need no special protection, and that we 
should advocate for greater legal autonomy, both in theory and in practice.  
While this approach has some appeal, this Article argues that it is practically 
and politically unachievable.  Furthermore, there is significant evidence that 
some adolescents would benefit from supportive adult guidance when facing 
difficult, consequential decisions. 
Adolescents occupy a unique space between childhood and adult-
hood.292  The debates about youth capacity for sound decision making con-
tinue to rage, and the law reflects these debates.  Youth law scholars have 
extensively dissected the inconsistencies in the law’s treatment of adoles-
cents.293  The growing body of scientific research on child development has 
only added fuel to the fire.  Science does not provide a simple answer to 
questions as to whether or when children might obtain adult-like capacities 
for sound decision making.  What the scientific research suggests, putting it 
all together, is that adolescents’ cognitive functioning is more like that of 
adults than of younger children, but adolescents may not exercise “judgment” 
 
 291. It is notable that, in contrast to decisions about pregnancy and parenting, 
minors can generally access contraception without parental or state involvement.  See 
supra Part I.A.  It may be that preventing teenage pregnancy is generally viewed as a 
public health good that, although still controversial, requires access to contraception.  
However, once a girl is pregnant, she deserves punishment for her “irresponsible” 
decision to have sex and, perhaps, for failing to use contraception. 
 292. Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 256 (“Adolescence, then, is less a place of 
being as it is a place of being in-between.”); Scott, The Legal Construction of Adoles-
cence, supra note 1, at 556 (“Conventional wisdom about adolescence generally 
tracks scientific knowledge about human development--individuals in this group are 
proceeding through a developmental stage between childhood and adulthood--they 
are neither children nor adults.”).  There is some debate about whether adolescence is 
a cultural creation, rather than an inevitable biological stage of development.  Regard-
less, in American law there has long been a “conviction that adolescents, despite their 
adult-like appearances, were somehow different and in need of adult guidance and 
legal protection.”  See Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130. 
 293. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 277; Jennifer Rosato, What Are the 
Implications of Roper’s Dilemma for Adolescent Health Law?, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 167 
(2011); Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118. 
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in the same manner as adults.294  In other words, adolescents can engage in 
rational thought processes but may nevertheless engage in poorer quality 
decision making due to age-related tendencies, such as impulsiveness, a focus 
on short-term versus long-term consequences, and undue emphasis on ap-
pearance and peer approval.295  Thus, although society recognizes that ado-
lescents can engage in adult-like rational thought processes296 and adult-like 
biological behaviors, such as sex and reproduction,297 society still feels the 
need to protect adolescents from their own poorer quality decision making.  
Such concerns are especially salient when the well-being of another genera-
tion – the infants of minor parents – depends upon the sound judgment of 
responsible parties.  Yet, in the context of sexuality and reproduction, society 
knows that many teenagers will not or cannot involve parents in their deci-
sion making, and that forced parental or governmental involvement does not 
always serve either generation of children’s best interests.  Given the tension 
between the need to make room for adolescents’ growing sense of autonomy 
and the desire to provide them with adult guidance in important decisions, 
this Part proposes regulatory reforms that involve third parties, other than 
parents or the state, in adolescents’ decisions about pregnancy and parenting. 
First, this Part summarizes the debates surrounding scientific evidence 
on adolescent decision making and its impact on the law.  Many scholars 
have noted that science does not impart definitive guidance for the law in this 
context.  Given the strong political resistance to expanding adolescent auton-
omy in general, this Part suggests solutions beyond the parent/state binary for 
providing more effective adult guidance to pregnant or parenting teenagers. 
Next, this Part briefly explores possible policy solutions involving third 
party adults within the contexts of child welfare, abortion, and adoption law 
that would better serve the goals of ensuring sound decision making for teen-
agers and protecting the well-being of minor parents and their infants.  The 
solutions I propose aim to value increased adolescent autonomy, to the extent 
feasible, and to support adolescents’ reproductive choices whether they 
choose abortion, parenting, or adoption.  In this Article, “third parties” means 
adults other than parents or state officials who have authority over the minor, 
 
 294. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1659; see discussion 
infra Part III.A. 
 295. See infra Part III.A. 
 296. For example, family law custody decisions include adolescents in the deci-
sion-making process.  Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 289–90 (“[F]amily courts rou-
tinely allow or even require that older children participate in decisions about custody, 
visitation, and adoption.”). 
 297. See supra Part II.A (discussing medical treatment exemptions for minors 
seeking STI treatment or prenatal care).  See also Steve James, Comment, Romeo and 
Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 
78 UMKC L. REV. 241 (2009) (discussing “Romeo & Juliet” statutory rape exemp-
tions); Chauntelle R. Wood, Romeo and Juliet: The 21st Century Juvenile Sex Of-
fenders, 39 S. U. L. REV. 385 (2012). 
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such as judges or child welfare agents.298  Depending on the context, third 
parties who might serve as resources for pregnant or parenting minors include 
extended family members, neighbors, and community members; health care 
professionals; and lawyers acting on behalf of the minor.299  Although private 
family law has expanded its understanding of the importance of third party 
adults to children’s well being, a similar shift has not been taken up as exten-
sively in child welfare law.300  Similarly, an alternative to parental involve-
ment – judicial bypass – has long been used in abortion law, but it has been 
an ineffective and punitive third party alternative.301  More effective third 
party solutions could be deployed both in the abortion context and in adop-
tion relinquishment cases – for example, requiring third party counseling in 
both circumstances.  Such solutions would better align the law in those areas 
as well. 
A.  Science, Politics, and Youth Law: Do Adolescents Need Adult 
Guidance? 
This Part provides a brief overview of existing scientific data on adoles-
cents’ capacities for sound decision making and the literature on the implica-
tions of this scientific evidence for legal policy.  Scientific evidence on ado-
lescent decision making appears to be in conflict in some respects, although 
scholars have attempted to reconcile the data.302  This Part argues that, given 
the scientific uncertainties and political realities surrounding policymaking in 
the context of teenage sexuality and reproduction, society must find more 
effective solutions to address the dilemma of the gradual maturity of pregnant 
or parenting adolescents. 
In recent decades, scientific research on adolescent development has 
grown exponentially.  This science has been used in conflicting ways in legal 
 
 298. Private family law’s acknowledgment of the importance of adults who are 
not parents, historically referred to as “third parties” or “legal strangers” to the child, 
has extended to the point that today, functioning in a parent-like role can lead to be-
coming a parent.  See Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents By the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 11, 19, 25–26 (2008); see also Manian, supra note 94, at 246–47 (summariz-
ing law and literature on private family law’s increasing recognition of third parties in 
family life).  Although it remains clear that only parents possess the constitutional 
right to control their children’s upbringing, the question of who counts as a parent has 
become increasingly complex.  See generally Appleton, supra; Manian, supra note 
94. 
 299. I do not attempt a detailed analysis of reform proposals incorporating third 
parties in this last Part.  Instead, I aim to sketch out the idea generally and urge a 
conversation about how to create space for adolescence in the law by providing op-
tions between the extremes of adolescent autonomy versus subjection to the authority 
of parent and state. 
 300. See Manian, supra note 94, at 247. 
 301. See id. at 245. 
 302. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1609. 
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advocacy.  Research in developmental psychology has shown that adoles-
cents as young as fourteen have cognitive abilities similar to adults.303  Advo-
cates for abortion rights have relied on this research to argue that minors 
should not be required to obtain parental or judicial consent prior to obtaining 
abortion care.304  In contrast, other areas of research, such as neuroscience, 
suggest that adolescents differ in fundamental ways in the quality of their 
decision making.305  Advocates for youth within the context of juvenile crime 
 
 303. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: A 
Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 423 (1978); David G. Scherer, 
The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions, 
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431, 436 (1991); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, 
The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 
53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595–96 (1982).  See generally Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 
935–39 (discussing research on adolescent decision-making capacity in healthcare 
contexts); Rosato, supra note 293, at 177–79. 
 304. See generally Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 938–41 (discussing abortion 
rights advocates use of scientific evidence to argue for adolescent autonomy in abor-
tion decision making and noting that “[t]here is a significant body of literature that 
stands for the proposition that young women are, in fact, largely capable of making 
decisions about terminating a pregnancy without the assistance of their parents”).  See 
also Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psy-
chological & Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
129, 140–42 (1992) (study indicated no difference between adolescents and adults 
considering abortion); Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors’ and Adults’ 
Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446, 446–51 (1980) (study of a 
small group of adults and adolescents awaiting pregnancy results found few age relat-
ed differences).  The American Psychological Association has submitted multiple 
briefs to the Supreme Court supporting the right of pregnant teenagers to make abor-
tion decisions, as well as issuing a policy statement supportive of adolescent abortion 
rights.  Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1607–08 n.3, 1630 n.91; 
Interdivisional Comm. on Adolescent Abortion, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological 
and Legal Issues, 42 AM. PSYCHO. 73 (1987). 
 305. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2012) (imposing mandatory 
life imprisonment without parole sentences for minors under the age of eighteen at the 
time of their crimes, including crimes involving homicide, violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Graham v. Florida, 130 
S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (holding that imposing life without parole on a juvenile 
offender for non-homicide crimes violates the 8th Amendment, and relying explicitly 
on “developments in psychology and brain science [that] continue to show fundamen-
tal differences between juvenile and adult minds”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
551, 569–70 (2005) (holding that juveniles cannot be subject to the death penalty 
under the Eighth Amendment, and discussing scientific evidence, including recent 
neuroscience research, on adolescent decision making and implications for adoles-
cents’ lesser criminal culpability).  See Rosato, supra note 293, at 169–77 (discussing 
recent neuroscience literature on adolescent brain development and the Roper and 
Graham decisions); Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspec-
tives from Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 55, 
55 (2007); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty By Reason of Ado-
lescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile 
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have relied on this research to argue that minors should not be subject to the 
death penalty or life without parole and, generally, that adolescents are less 
culpable in the criminal context.306  The Supreme Court has struggled in both 
areas of youth law to incorporate the scientific evidence on child develop-
ment and balance the interests of adolescents, their parents, and the state.307  
In both abortion and juvenile criminal law decisions, the Supreme Court has 
consistently taken the view of young people as “flawed and generally imma-
ture whether they are committing capital crimes or seeking to terminate an 
unwanted pregnancy.”308 
Scholars have also examined the tensions within the law created by the 
scientific evidence and conflicting advocacy positions.309  Part of the difficul-
ty in reconciling the scientific evidence and varying policy positions in the 
healthcare versus criminal contexts lies in the concept of “competence,” 
which does not have a simple definition.310  Elizabeth Scott has argued that 
the studies on adolescent competence in the healthcare context have overly 
 
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011 (2003); see also Mutcherson, su-
pra note 5, at 938–53 (summarizing literature on adolescent capacity for decision-
making in criminal law context); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution 
of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138 (1998). 
 306. See Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 942–53 (discussing strategies of advocates 
for youth in the context of the juvenile criminal system). 
 307. See Bellotti v. Baird (Belotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 635–36 (1979) (plurality 
opinion); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482–83; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 
543 U.S. at 569.  See generally, Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 939–54 (discussing 
Supreme Court decisions on minors access to abortion care and juvenile criminal 
culpability). 
 308. Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 954 (discussing Supreme Court decisions on 
minors access to abortion care and juvenile criminal culpability). 
 309. For example, Professor Kimberly Mutcherson argues that the positions of 
advocates for youth who argue that adolescents are competent to make decisions 
about abortion, but not culpable in the same manner as adults for criminal acts, do 
contain an underlying consistency.  Id. at 929.  She explains that the context of deci-
sion-making, i.e., formal versus informal settings, affects the quality of decision-
making.  See id. at 958–64.  Therefore, “it is logical to conclude that the decision-
making process in formal healthcare settings lead to better decisions that the law 
should support than is the case in the informal settings in which young people decide 
to participate in criminal activities.”  Id. at 929.  Others have also taken this contextu-
al view of adolescent decision-making capacity.  See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 114, at 
108–14; Rosato, supra note 293, at 179–81; Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adoles-
cents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Pen-
alty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592 (2009). 
 310. Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 929–34 (discussing definitions of competence 
or capacity for decision making in healthcare, lawyer-client, and criminal law set-
tings); see also Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1146 (2011) (dis-
cussing related concept of “maturity” and arguing that maturity is a cultured concept 
rather than a scientific one). 
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focused on the informed consent doctrine and thus, have excluded other im-
portant factors in decision making: 
[I]nformed consent doctrine has shaped the discourse and provided the 
standard for comparing the capabilities of minors with those of adults.  
This framework for assessing competence focuses on two aspects of 
cognitive functioning: the capacity for understanding and the capacity 
for reasoning.  The doctrine, and thus the framework, exclude inquiry 
into aspects of decisionmaking [sic] that have to do with the quality of 
judgment; an inclination to make “poor” choices does not signify in-
competence under informed consent tests.311 
Professor Scott’s distinction between cognitive abilities and abilities to 
exercise sound judgment is useful for understanding the conflicting uses of 
scientific research on adolescent decision making in the law.  While the stud-
ies focused on cognitive abilities show that by age fourteen, many adoles-
cents have adult-like cognitive functioning, other studies focusing on psycho-
social development and more recent neuroscience research suggest that ado-
lescents may nevertheless have poorer decision-making outcomes.312  Thus, 
the scientific research supports two different kinds of intuitions: that adoles-
cents are more advanced in their reasoning abilities than younger children but 
also less advanced than adults in the quality of their decision making.  In par-
ticular, adolescents differ from adults in attitude toward risk, in impulsive-
ness, in greater weight attached to short-term rather than long-term conse-
quences, and in the importance attached to personal appearance and peer in-
fluence.313 
In addition, although there is “unassailable evidence that adolescents do 
not act or think like young children,” Professor Scott argues that the tests of 
cognitive ability alone are unpersuasive to policymakers “because [they] do[] 
 
 311. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1609 (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted).  For example, in the healthcare context, studies have found that 
“minors aged 14 years and higher make decisions regarding the waiver of rights or 
consent to medical procedures in generally the same manner that adults do;” however, 
researchers have noted that this research also “need[s] to consider judgment factors 
(e.g., consideration of social consequences) as well as cognitive and reasoning ability 
in determining adolescents’ legal capacities.”  Preston A. Britner et al., Evaluating 
Juveniles’ Competence to Make Abortion Decisions: How Social Science Can Inform 
the Law, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 46 (1998).  See also Oberman, Minor 
Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 134 (“[A]dolescents experience a chronic 
disjuncture caused by varying levels of biological development, cognitive ability, and 
experiential knowledge.  Rather than mistaking one of these markers, such as cogni-
tive ability, as indicative of adult-like capacity, the health care system’s response to 
adolescents should reflect our awareness of this disjuncture.”). 
 312. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1622–42. 
 313. Id. at 1642 n.126, 1643–47. 
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not respond to important concerns underlying paternalistic policies.”314  In 
particular, with regard to minors, society cares not only about whether they 
engage in rational processes of decision making, but also whether they are 
capable of exercising good judgment such that the results of their decisions 
are good ones.315  For example, Professor Scott notes that “few would argue, 
on ‘competence’ grounds, that twelve year olds who can pass the legally re-
quired written and performance tests should be awarded a license to drive a 
motor vehicle.”316  From the perspective of the public and policymakers, 
“Protecting minors from the harm that can result from their own poor judg-
ment seems important in order to preserve the options of youthful decision 
makers for a future when it is presumed, they will make sounder choices.”317  
Thus, despite evidence on the adult-like cognitive abilities of adolescents, 
“resistance to reformulating the premises of legal policy toward children is 
formidable.”318  Professor Scott concludes, “The paternalistic goal of protect-
ing minors and society from the costs of immature judgment is an even more 
powerful constraint on initiatives to extend adolescent self-determination than 
is usually acknowledged.”319 
In a similar vein, Jennifer Rosato emphasizes that even as neuroscience 
and other disciplines develop more research on the adolescent brain, “core 
values underlying public policies, not science, ultimately will help resolve 
this dilemma” on the law’s approach to adolescent capacity and culpability in 
 
 314. See id. at 1610.  See also Lois Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal 
Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 25, 25–50 (N. Dickon Rep-
pucci et al. eds., 1984) (discussing legal standards of competency in various contexts 
and applicability of psychological studies on capacity evaluations for minors). 
 315. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1656 (“Moreover, if the 
values that drive risky choices are associated with youth, and predictably will change 
with maturity, then our paternalistic inclination is to protect the young decisionmak-
er—and ourselves—from his or her bad judgment.  This impulse is not quelled by the 
knowledge that, in making the ‘poor’ decision, the youthful decisionmaker has en-
gaged in a rational process.”). 
 316. Id. at 1638.  Even if some adolescents have adult-like abilities in their deci-
sion-making, evidence suggests that teenagers “have widely varying levels of compe-
tency that depend not only on their biological stage of development, but also on their 
life experience.”  Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 133.  Re-
search establishing the onset of adult-like cognitive functioning for older adolescents 
“also indicates that these abilities are acquired gradually, and that they reflect both a 
biological and an environmental component.”  See id.  Scholars generally agree that 
“maturity occurs on a continuum.”  Todres, supra note 310, at 1161. 
 317. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1639. 
 318. Id. at 1612. 
 319. Id.; see also Emily Buss, What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn from 
Child Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 44 (2009) [hereinafter Buss, 
What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn] (noting that focusing solely on chil-
dren’s developmental capacities “runs the risk of failing to account from some of the 
real reasons we support special rights and protections for children,” such as an oppor-
tunity to learn how exercise their rights well). 
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various contexts.320  Of course, what these values should be remain hotly 
debated, particularly around abortion.  Several other scholars also argue that 
tying law to developmental theories about children raises numerous risks, 
including serious questions about the reliability of recent scientific evidence, 
how science should be translated into legal policy, and how legal rules them-
selves affect child development.321 
Given the scientific uncertainties surrounding adolescent development 
and the public’s strong intuition that adolescents make decisions differently 
than adults, it remains extremely difficult to convince the public in general 
and state officials in particular that adolescents should have a right to make 
autonomous decisions in any arena, and particularly in controversial areas 
related to sexuality, reproduction, and teenage parenting.322  Rather than ig-
noring adolescence as a distinct category between childhood and adulthood, 
the law could acknowledge adolescence as an in-between status – neither 
child nor adult – by seeking solutions between the parent/state binary, and in 
particular solutions that are supportive of adolescents’ sexual and reproduc-
tive decisions rather than punitive.  The next Part briefly sketches out possi-
bilities for reform and urges further conversation along these lines. 
B.  Third Parties in Private Family Law and Possibilities for Reform 
Policy solutions involving third party adults could accommodate both 
scientific evidence and popular intuitions about adolescents’ need for adult 
guidance, while also supporting adolescents’ reproductive decision making 
whether they seek to terminate a pregnancy, parent their infants, or relinquish 
for adoption.  It is important to reiterate that I am not arguing that teenage 
parents should have no oversight whatsoever.  Expanding the list of kinds of 
adults who might become involved with pregnant or parenting youth’s deci-
sion making could provide more effective oversight.  We could establish in-
terventions that provide pregnant or parenting teenagers with support from 
trusted third party adults in situations where now, those adolescents must 
either submit to parental or state authorities who might undermine the adoles-
cents’ reproductive decisions or are given no support until a crisis occurs.  A 
third party approach could also assist those adolescents who would benefit 
from adult counsel while avoiding the potential harms of enforced parental or 
 
 320. Rosato, supra note 293, at 171; see also Scott, The Legal Construction of 
Adolescence, supra note 1, at 564 (discussing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and 
noting that “legal childhood and adulthood are social and political constructs, rather 
than simply products of scientific understanding of human development”). 
 321. See Clare Huntington, Neuroscience and the Child Welfare System, 21 
BROOKLYN J. L. & POL’Y 37, 52–57 (2012) (discussing potential concerns with rely-
ing on neuroscience for developing child welfare policy); Buss, What the Law Should 
(And Should Not) Learn, supra note 319, at 53. 
 322. Id. at 56. 
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state involvement in the sensitive arena of adolescent sexuality and reproduc-
tion.323 
A number of scholars and researchers have noted that third parties could 
help to ensure sound decision making for adolescents.324  For example, in the 
healthcare context, Jennifer Rosato argues that given individual variation in 
development, healthcare providers should be permitted to assess a minor’s 
maturity and, if appropriate, provide care as the minor wishes without involv-
ing a parent.325  In a similar vein, Kimberly Mutcherson argues for a model of 
shared decision making between adolescents and parents in the healthcare 
context.326  Her model would allow exceptions from shared adolescent-parent 
healthcare decision making if an adolescent does not wish to include a parent, 
such as in decisions about abortion care.327  Dean Rosato and Professor 
Mutcherson essentially argue for a third party solution with regard to sexual 
and reproductive healthcare, with the healthcare provider serving as the third-
party adult advisor.328  As Franklin Zimring argued in his seminal work, ado-
lescence could be treated as a period of “semi-autonomy,” and youths should 
be given the freedom to make choices in a protective setting, so that they 
have a kind of “learners permit” for full participation in society.329 
Who that third party should be will vary by the context.  A thorough 
analysis of various kinds of third party interventions, as well as their pros and 
cons, is beyond the scope of this Article.  Below, this Part explores a few 
possibilities for legal reform involving third party adults who could more 
effectively support pregnant or parenting minors.  While requiring involve-
ment of third party adults does not grant adolescents full autonomy, these 
proposals aim to value teenagers’ own reproductive decisions and support 
their choices whether they seek abortion care, to maintain the (minor) parent-
child bond, or to relinquish their infant for adoption.  These recommendations 
are made tentatively and with the understanding that third party solutions may 
 
 323. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 300–24. 
 324. See Steinberg et al., supra note 309, at 586–87, 592–93 (emphasis added) 
(“[W]here emotional and social influences on judgment are minimized or can be miti-
gated, and where there are consultants who can provide objective information about 
the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be just 
as capable of mature decision making as adults, at least by the time they are 16.”). 
 325. See Rosato, supra note 293, at 181–89. 
 326. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 300–24. 
 327. Id. at 304; see also Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 963–64 (“Though there may 
be disagreement about how to interpret available science, it is indisputable that there 
are consequential differences between adults and adolescents when it comes to mak-
ing decisions. . . .  A young person’s decision-making skills can be enhanced when 
coupled with opportunities to engage with responsible adults before making a deci-
sion whereas the deficiencies in adolescent decision-making are brought painfully to 
light in other circumstances that play to the weakest elements of the adolescent expe-
rience.”). 
 328. Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 301; Rosato, supra note 293, at 179–81. 
 329. FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89–
101 (1982). 
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be expensive, politically charged, difficult to implement, and bear risks of 
their own.  Nonetheless, it is important to generate a conversation in this di-
rection.  More openness to incorporating third party adults into adolescent 
decision making on reproduction and parenting could potentially benefit 
many struggling adolescents. 
First, with regard to child welfare law, the expansion of third party 
rights in private family law suggests models for incorporating third parties 
into public family law in ways that would support the minor parent-child 
relationship, even if the minor parent cannot care for her infant.330  In private 
family law, as many scholars have noted, parental rights have become dis-
aggregated in numerous ways.  The rise of joint custody and corresponding 
emphasis on “shared parenting” and growing recognition of functional par-
ents all indicate a move away from an “all or nothing” approach to 
parenthood.331  In contrast, in public family law, the “all or nothing” approach 
still prevails.332  If abuse or neglect has occurred, advocates for minor parents 
should focus on obtaining appropriate services for the minor so that she can 
exit the child welfare system with her parental rights intact.333  For those ado-
lescent parents who cannot maintain custody of their children, the law could 
look to alternatives that allow the minor parent to maintain a relationship with 
her infant, even though the infant’s primary custody may be transferred to a 
third party non-parent adult.  Options like subsidized guardianship and open 
adoption could allow for an ongoing relationship between the minor parent 
and her infant, while also providing appropriate care for the infant.334  Yet, in 
child welfare law, the dyadic parental model still dominates over a triadic 
model.335  Placements incorporating third party adults into the minor parent’s 
 
 330. Private family law refers to disputes in the context of the private distribution 
of wealth and child custody determinations that do not involve public benefits; public 
family law concerns state public benefits systems, including the child welfare system, 
which primarily affects poor families.  See Gosdoe, supra note 155, at 116.  See gen-
erally How the Child Welfare System Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (May 
2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf. 
 331. See Manian, supra note 94 (summarizing recent trends to recognize chil-
dren’s relationships with third party adults in private family law). 
 332. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 170 (arguing that child welfare should parse 
out parenthood in public families in the same way as in private families). 
 333. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 45. 
 334. Godsoe, supra note 155, at 145–48 (discussing subsidized guardianship as 
reform with potential to solve some of the underlying problems of the child welfare 
system); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 1, 17 (2013) (discussing the possibilities of open adoption arrangements in the 
child welfare system).  In the context of subsidized guardianship or open adoption, 
the minor parents’ parent (grandparent) could serve as the guardian or adoptive par-
ent.  Id. at 14.  These options may be preferable since the grandparent would not have 
to terminate his or her own child’s parental rights to assist with the care and custody 
of the grandchild.  Id. 
 335. Godsoe, supra note 155, at 146. 
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relationship with her infant remain underutilized in favor of the traditional 
path of termination of parental rights and closed adoption.336 
Third party guardianship or custodial placements that allow for the mi-
nor parent to continue her parental relationship present a better alternative 
than termination of parental rights, but these options typically come too late.  
Even more importantly, we need to emphasize policy solutions to prevent 
abuse or neglect by minor parents.337  Supportive adult guidance in the form 
of a third party adult mentor presents one promising type of third party early 
intervention.338  An extensive literature on the benefits of adult mentoring for 
at-risk youth indicates that third party adult support can improve outcomes 
for teenage mothers and their infants.339  Numerous studies on various forms 
 
 336. See Cynthia Godsoe, Permanency Puzzle, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1113, 
1120 (describing underutilization of subsidized guardianship and open adoption in 
child welfare law). 
 337. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW FAMILY LAW 
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 93 (2014) (describing how child welfare law 
“suffers from a fundamental misorientation” away from prevention and instead to 
“wait for a crisis and then intervene in a heavy-handed manner”).  A number of schol-
ars have advocated a public health approach to child welfare, which focuses on evi-
dence based identification of risk factors and interventions to prevent child maltreat-
ment.  See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 86, 174–81; Annette Appell, The Myth of 
Separation, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 291, 298 (2011); Marsha Garrison, Reforming 
Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 590, 599 
(2005); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child Wel-
fare, 92 NEB. L. REV. 897, 899 (2014).  As numerous scholars of child welfare law 
have noted, best practices for minor parents should include interventions that avoid 
teenage parents being charged with abuse or neglect at the outset.  Stotland & God-
soe, supra note 168, at 45.  Early intervention is particularly important for minor 
parents who are already wards of the state: 
 
Parenting wards present a crucial point of intervention in the foster care cycle.  
Failure to meet the needs of this population places both the foster youth and 
their children at increased risk of homelessness and poverty, and sets the stage 
for yet another generation of children to be removed from their parents and 
raised by the state. 
 
Id. at 7. 
 338. See Godsoe, supra note 336, at 1134 (noting mentoring programs as poten-
tially useful intervention for youth in foster care). 
 339. See Cynthia L. Sipe, Mentoring Programs for Adolescents: A Research 
Summary, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 251, 251–60 (2002) (summarizing research on 
youth mentoring programs from the mid-1980s through the late-1990s).  The research 
has focused on various issues such as documenting the benefits of mentoring, analyz-
ing the nature of mentoring relationships and the practices of effective mentors, and 
defining best practices for programs.  See id.  Generally, the literature defines “men-
tors” as persons who deliberately “support, guide, and shape individuals younger or 
less experienced than themselves as they weather difficult periods, enter new arenas, 
or undertake challenging tasks.”  Antronette K. Yancey et al., Role Modeling, Risk, 
and Resilience in California Adolescents, 48 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 36, 37 (2011).  
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of mentoring as an intervention for pregnant and parenting teenagers have 
indicated positive effects.340  Researchers have concluded that “it appears that 
guidance and support from an adult outside of the home can be extremely 
influential in the lives of young mothers.”341  For example, the Nurse-Family 
 
Mentors do not include peers or romantic partners, but nonparent relatives can serve 
as mentors.  See Elena L. Klaw et al., Natural Mentors in the Lives of African Ameri-
can Adolescent Mothers: Tracking Relationships Over Time, 32 J. YOUTH & 
ADOLESCENCE 223, 226 (2003).  In addition to formal mentors assigned through men-
toring programs, youth report nonparent-mentoring relationships with extended fami-
ly members (e.g., grandparents and aunts/uncles), adults in professional roles (e.g., 
teachers, guidance counselors, and ministers), and adults in more informal capacities 
(e.g., coaches, friends’ parents, and co-workers).  See id. at 231. 
 340. See Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 231.  For example, one study of a home-
based formal mentoring program found that formal mentors were effective in prevent-
ing rapid repeat births among the study participants, who were all low-income, Afri-
can American adolescent mothers living with their mothers (the infants’ grandmoth-
ers).  Maureen M. Black et al., Delaying Second Births Among Adolescent Mothers: A 
Randomized, Controlled Trial of a Home-Based Mentoring Program, 118 PEDIATRICS 
1087, 1096 (2006).  The study authors hypothesized that since mentoring “operates 
through the formation of a relationship that enable participants to look to the mentor 
for support,” it would be an ideal intervention for preventing rapid second births.  Id. 
at 1096–98.  The authors noted the limits of the study, including the small number of 
participants and the difficulty of determining whether those who participated were 
more motivated to avoid second births in the first place, but nevertheless concluded 
that the “findings suggest that a mentorship model that includes structured interven-
tion, along with a strong focus on building a supportive relationship, may be an effec-
tive strategy in reducing second births.”  Id. at 1097. 
 341. See Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 230.  Researchers have also studied the 
protective influence of natural mentors (as opposed to formal mentors assigned 
through a program), such as special aunts, neighbors, or teachers, on pregnant and 
parenting teenagers.  Id. at 223.  Several studies focusing on African-American teen-
agers concluded that natural mentors are an important resource for adolescent moth-
ers.  Id. at 231.  One study suggested that natural mentors may help to improve the 
career development of pregnant and parenting African-American adolescents.  Elena 
L. Klaw & Jean E. Rhodes, Mentor Relationships and the Career Development of 
Pregnant and Parenting African-American Teenagers, 19 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 551, 
551 (1995).  The results of the study provided “further evidence that natural mentors 
are an important protective resource for pregnant and parenting, African-American 
adolescents.”  Id. at 558.  The authors concluded that the study results have important 
implications for interventions with young women of color.  Id. at 560.  The study 
provides “indirect evidence for the potential value of programs that pair volunteer 
mentors with at-risk adolescents,” since, like natural mentors, volunteer adult mentors 
may be able to offer at-risk youth protection against the many stressors in their lives.  
Id.  Although the study findings are limited, the authors emphasized that “we should 
not minimize the potentially protective influence of natural mentors in the lives of 
inner-city teenagers.”  Id.  Similarly, another study on natural mentors in the lives of 
African-American adolescent mothers found that adolescents with mentor relation-
ships over the course of two years were more likely to have remained in school or 
graduated than those without mentors.  Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 223.  Ultimate-
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Partnership, which involves intensive home visits by a nurse during a moth-
er’s pregnancy and for the following two years, has shown that third party 
adult intervention can lead to demonstrably positive results.342  Importantly, 
researchers have emphasized, “By relying on nonparents adults, adolescent 
mothers can gain some autonomy while simultaneously obtaining much 
needed emotional support and advice.”343  In sum, the literature on the bene-
fits of nonparent adult mentoring for adolescents reinforces the notion that 
third party adults can provide effective support for pregnant and parenting 
teenagers.344 
Obviously, mentoring programs and other solutions incorporating third 
party adults into the minor parent-child relationship, such as subsidized 
guardianship and open adoption, do not provide a panacea for the many ills of 
the child welfare system.  The child welfare system is extremely complicated, 
and no single simple solution can address its myriad problems.  The well-
being of pregnant and parenting adolescents also strongly depends on other 
resources, such as adequate healthcare, child care, housing, and educational 
 
ly, the study findings suggested that the support of an enduring natural mentor may 
help facilitate young mothers’ school retention and completion.  See id. at 229–31. 
 342. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 337, at 187–90. 
 343. Klaw & Rhodes, supra note 341, at 552. 
 344. The literature overall suggests benefits to mentoring adolescent mothers over 
time.  Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 230.  Furthermore, despite several studies’ focus 
on natural mentors, researchers have noted that many adolescent mothers have no 
such support in their lives, and therefore, providing young mothers with volunteer 
mentors may be a beneficial intervention: “Skillful, persistent volunteers could poten-
tially earn the trust of adolescent mothers and offer adolescents some of the benefits 
that natural mentors seem to afford.”  Id. at 231.  Another study found that African-
American adolescent mothers who identified natural mentors (defined as a supportive 
non-parent or non-peer) derived more benefits from their social networks and report-
ed lower levels of depression than similar youth without a mentor.  See Jean E. 
Rhodes et al., Natural Mentors: An Overlooked Resource in the Social Networks of 
Young, African American Mothers, 20 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 445, 445 (1992).  
One intervention study based on the principles of mentorship indicated that intensive 
home visitation by nursing paraprofessionals indigenous to the community may be 
effective in reducing infant mortality, low birthweight, and child maltreatment within 
a sample of high-risk, low-income, urban-residing adolescents.  See Linda Flynn, The 
Adolescent Parenting Program: Improving Outcomes Through Mentorship, 16 PUB. 
HEALTH NURSING 182, 188 (1999).  A study examining factors affecting drinking 
patterns of pregnant adolescents found that those who identified either nonparent 
mentors and/or parents who provided high levels of support were less likely to have 
consumed alcohol during pregnancy.  See Jean E. Rhodes et al., Risk and Protective 
Factors for Alcohol Use Among Pregnant African-American, Hispanic, and White 
Adolescents: The Influence of Peers, Sexual Partners, Family Members, and Mentors, 
19 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 555, 555 (1994).  Reports of mentors’ protective qualities 
are also corroborated by the literature on resilience, which has highlighted the posi-
tive influence of nonparental adults in the lives of at-risk children and adolescents.  
Klaw & Rhodes, supra note 341, at 552. 
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and employment opportunities.345  Thinking about solutions that look to third 
party adults to assist minor parents in their parenting, rather than heavy-
handed state intervention, represents just one move in the right direction to 
provide substance to minors’ parental rights.  Third party adult support could 
help to ensure that minor parents in the system can maintain a parental rela-
tionship with their children if they wish, and most importantly, this support 
can help to keep minor parents and their infants out of the child welfare sys-
tem in the first place.346 
Second, with regard to the abortion and adoption contexts, providing 
pregnant or parenting teenagers with the option to seek guidance from third 
party adults offers much promise for more effective protection of adolescents’ 
well-being.347  I have argued elsewhere that developments in private family 
law bolster the case for amending statutes requiring parental involvement 
with abortion to allow teenagers to consult with designated adults other than 
parents or judges.348  In particular, private family law’s increasing recognition 
of the importance of non-parent third party adults in children’s lives buttress-
es calls for reformulating parental involvement legislation to permit adoles-
cent girls to obtain consent from trusted adults other than parents and in lieu 
of a formal judicial interrogation.349  As in the abortion context, we should 
consider whether adult support – and what kinds of adult support – would 
better serve the well-being of minor parents considering relinquishment of 
their infant for adoption.  Regulatory reform of both abortion and adoption 
law to include involvement by third party non-parent, non-state adults, would 
also make for a more obviously coherent body of law on pregnant teenagers 
who choose to avoid parenting either through abortion or adoption.350  Re-
 
 345. Klaw & Rhodes, supra note 341, at 560. 
 346. For example, 
 
Research indicates that involvement of adults with teen parents improves de-
cision-making and outcomes.  In fact, one of the most important variables in 
determining whether a teen mother will become the respondent in an abuse 
and neglect action tends to be her living situation.  Adolescent mothers living 
with an adult relative were much less likely to have their children removed for 
abuse and neglect than those who were not living with an adult relative. 
 
Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 330 (citing Patricia Flanagan et al., Predicting Mal-
treatment of Children of Teenage Mothers, 149 PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 
451, 451–55 (1995)).  Of course, sometimes the involvement of relatives can be det-
rimental rather than helpful.  Id. (noting that attorneys should be watchful of the in-
volvement of relatives of minor parents in child welfare proceedings if the family 
members are not supporting or are interfering with the client’s decision making). 
 347. See Manian, supra note 94, at 241. 
 348. See id. at 246–51. 
 349. See id. at 246. 
 350. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 134–46 (arguing that similarities between 
abortion and adoption decisions calls for alignment of the law on minors’ decision 
making in these contexts). 
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forms looking to third parties could also more effectively serve the law’s 
purported goal of ensuring sound decision making for pregnant teenagers 
choosing abortion or adoption, rather than surreptitiously operating as a 
means of punishment.351 
For example, perhaps offering adolescents who are considering either 
abortion or adoption relinquishment a menu of options to choose from in 
terms of seeking adult guidance in their decision making would grant adoles-
cents some autonomy while still ensuring adult oversight.  In the abortion 
context, states could allow teenage girls to choose between involving a par-
ent, an adult family member, a counselor, or a judge prior to receiving abor-
tion care.  Scholars have proposed such reforms to parental involvement leg-
islation, and a few states have adopted laws that allow for third parties other 
than judges to approve adolescent girls’ abortion care.352 
Similarly, adoption law could provide a list of adults that a minor parent 
choosing relinquishment would consult prior to a final consent to relinquish-
ment.  Birth parent advocates, scholars, and courts have argued for various 
kinds of adoption law reforms, particularly for minor parents consenting to 
voluntary relinquishment.  Adoption case law and literature suggest that 
mandatory parental or judicial involvement in minor parents’ relinquishment 
decisions could present many of the same problems of shaming and imposi-
tion of the adults’ own normative judgments as in the abortion context.353  
While mandatory parental or judicial approval may prove arbitrary, the ab-
 
 351. See Samuels, supra note 208, at 509 (arguing that adoption law generally 
fails to promote its stated goal of ensuring birth mothers’ informed decision making 
with respect to relinquishment for adoption). 
 352. See Manian, supra note 94, at 246–51. 
 353. As with abortion decisions, parents or judges could coerce the minor to con-
form to the adults’ own normative view of the correct decision rather than supporting 
and guiding the minor’s decision-making process.  Some revocation cases indicate 
that family members have put pressure on teenagers to consent to relinquish their 
infant.  See, e.g., Adoption of J.M.M. v. New Beginnings of Tupelo, Inc., 796 So. 2d 
975, 983 (Miss. 2001) (denying revocation of adoption decree even though facts indi-
cated sixteen-year-old mother was pressured into consenting by her parents); 
Gaughan v. Gilliam, 401 N.W.2d 687 (Neb. 1987) (holding that mere fact that birth 
mother might be pressured by friends or family does not amount to “undue influence” 
sufficient to invalidate her relinquishment for the child even when birth mother is 
sixteen years old).  Similarly, requiring judicial approval for a minor parent’s consent 
to relinquishment may result in unwarranted scrutiny, rather than skilled and unbiased 
counseling toward a decision that serves the well-being of the minor parent and her 
infant.  See Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[2]  (“Risks are posed, however, even 
by this [court process for voluntary relinquishment].  Not the least of these is that the 
biological mother’s resolve to relinquish her child could be subject to extensive and 
inappropriate scrutiny.”).  Of course, some birth mothers may also feel pressure not to 
relinquish their infants for adoption.  See Kyle Wier, Promoting Adoption as a Solu-
tion to Teen Pregnancy: A Study and Model, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 319 (2003) (con-
ducting small study of teen mothers in a group home and finding various pressures for 
teen parents to select child rearing over adoption). 
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sence of any adult guidance in some cases leaves the minor parent vulnerable 
to coercive influence from others, as the revocation case law demonstrates. 
Instead of enforced parental or judicial involvement prior to relinquish-
ment, the law could also give minors the option of seeking professional coun-
seling or independent legal representation, along with procedural reforms, 
such as longer time frames post-birth for obtaining consent for relinquish-
ment.354  As in abortion law, counseling by health care professionals could 
serve as a more effective means of supporting sound decision making than a 
judicial interrogation.355  In addition, adoption law critics often suggest inde-
 
 354. “Reforming the law to give birth mothers more time to change their minds or 
ensure them legal counsel, as some have proposed, could help reshape the emotional 
landscape.”  Appleton, supra note 11, at 285 (citing Janet G. v. N.Y. Foundling 
Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646, 651 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978)); Samuels, supra note 208, at 
509. 
 355. Of course, requiring independent counseling and the waiting periods that 
typically go along with such counseling in the adoption context would echo standard 
techniques of anti-abortion advocacy.  Caitlin Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Bur-
den Standard, and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 291, 291 (2010) (discussing the “undue burden” of abortion regulations, includ-
ing waiting periods, “informed consent” and independent counseling, as “physical, 
familial, and spiritual invasions of women’s privacy”).  If such requirements make 
sense in adoption law, then those opposed to abortion might argue, why not also in 
abortion law?  In other words, can advocates for minors’ reproductive rights coherent-
ly argue in favor of counseling and waiting periods in adoption law while resisting 
such requirements in abortion law?  One argument is that more involvement by third 
party adults might be needed in the adoption context than in the abortion context.  In 
abortion care, the physician is already obligated to ensure the patient’s informed con-
sent and can serve as third party support for the minor.  See Mutcherson, supra note 
27, at 304 (arguing that health care provider can serve as third party adult advisor for 
minor seeking abortion care).  In adoption law, the minor parent may have no one to 
represent her interests.  Adoption is also legally more complicated, particularly given 
the confusion surrounding open adoption and the number of revocation cases where 
false promises of ongoing visitation have induced birth mothers to relinquish their 
children and led to revocation disputes.  See, e.g., In re S.O., 795 P.2d 254, 254 (Co-
lo. 1990) (holding that biological mother and stepfather’s unenforceable and false 
promise of visitation rights did not constitute fraud sufficient to invalidate the con-
sent); In re Adoption of J.H.G., 869 P.2d 640, 648–49 (Kan. 1994) (holding that birth 
mother failed to establish that adoptive parents had fraudulently promised that she 
would have post-adoption visitation); In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690, 711–
12 (Miss. 2003) (denying minors’ request for revocation of consent despite facts 
showing minor parent was denied promise of visitation); Kathleen G. v. Saint Law-
rence Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 565 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (hold-
ing that birth mother would be held to her voluntary surrender of child even though 
she had mistaken belief she would be entitled to visitation); see also Thompson & 
Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02 [1][b] (“[A] biological parent’s mistake regarding 
the effect of the consent will not be a ground for revocation, particularly where the 
effect of the consent was explained.”).  Nevertheless, given political resistance to 
abortion rights, it might be most feasible to seek statutory reforms requiring that inde-
pendent counseling professionals guide teenage decision making in both the abortion 
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pendent legal representation for birth parents as a crucially needed reform, 
especially for minor parents.356  Many states permit out-of-court consents to 
be executed before a notary public or even the attorney representing the pro-
spective adoptive parents – procedures that are “often criticized as providing 
insufficient evidence that the parent executing the consent or relinquishment 
did so knowingly and voluntarily.”357  Adoption law experts have long sug-
gested independent legal representation for minor parents considering execut-
ing a voluntary consent for adoption.358  Particularly given the complexity of 
open adoption, the current form of many if not most domestic adoptions,359 
minor parents would likely benefit from independent legal counsel who could 
accurately describe their rights post-adoption.360 
 
and adoption contexts.  See Manian, supra note 94, at 251 (arguing that third party 
counseling would be better compromise than judicial bypass, particularly given polit-
ical resistance to adolescent abortion rights). 
 356. Vivek S. Sankaran, A Hidden Crisis: The Need to Strengthen Representation 
of Parents in Child Protective Proceeding, 89 MICH. B. J. 36, 37 (2010) [hereinafter 
Sankaran, A Hidden Crisis] (“A national consensus is emerging that zealous legal 
representation of parents is crucial in ensuring that the child welfare system produces 
just outcomes for children.”).  Studies show that when parents have the right to coun-
sel hearings are faster saving millions of dollars to the government.  Vivek S. Sanka-
ran, Protecting a Parent’s Right to Counsel in Child Welfare Cases, 13 MICH. CHILD 
WELFARE L. J. 2, 3 (2009); see also Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 317 (“Children 
need legal counsel when making the decision to relinquish their infant or when facing 
termination of parental rights.”). 
 357. Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[2]; cf. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-405(a)(4) 
(1994) (“A consent or relinquishment executed by a parent or guardian must be 
signed or confirmed in the presence of . . . a lawyer other than a lawyer who is repre-
senting an adoptive parent or the agency to which a minor is relinquished . . . .”). 
 358. For example, the Uniform Adoption Act provides that “[a] parent who is a 
minor is competent to execute a consent or relinquishment if the parent has had access 
to counseling and has had the advice of a lawyer who is not representing an adoptive 
parent or the agency to which the parent’s child is relinquished.”  UNIF. ADOPTION 
ACT § 2-405(c).  Ideally, best practices for minor parents considering placing their 
infants for adoption should incorporate all of these suggestions for reform: sufficient 
time post-birth to make a final decision; skilled and unbiased counseling from trained 
professionals unaffiliated with adoptive parents or agencies; and independent legal 
counsel to provide adequate advice on the legal consequences of adoption.  See Sam-
uels, supra note 208, at 566–72 (summarizing best practices for voluntary relin-
quishments regardless of age of the birth parent). 
 359. Open adoption is commonplace today in the United States.  See Gaddie, 
supra note 227; Appell, supra note 227, at 4.  Although open adoption has potential 
pitfalls, “evidence indicates that open adoption has decreased some of the negative 
emotions that birth parents once felt in closed adoptions.”  Appleton, supra note 11, at 
320. 
 360. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 151–53 (arguing that legal complexity of 
adoption adds additional reason to grant minor parents special protections that may be 
unnecessary for minors seeking abortion care). 
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Of course, adequate counseling and legal advice do not provide a silver 
bullet for the variety of concerns surrounding minor parents’ relinquishments, 
particularly given the ethical complexities involved when lawyers represent 
minors.361  There is an extensive literature debating the lawyers’ role in repre-
senting adolescents and children.362  In many cases, it remains uncertain 
whether the lawyer should represent the minors’ expressed wishes or deter-
mine the best interests for the minor.  In the case of minor parents, the best 
interests of both generations of children must be considered, complicating 
matters further. 
 
 361. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 129, at 337–38 (“But appointment or 
retention of legal counsel does not necessarily ensure greater protection for the minor.  
The standard problem for lawyers representing minors, whether in custody cases, 
delinquency actions, neglect proceedings, or civil commitments is what model of 
representation should be used: advocating the child’s wishes; determining the child’s 
best interests and advocating those; or presenting options to the court as a neutral fact 
finder.”). 
 362. A comparison to legal representation in the child welfare system is illustra-
tive on this point.  Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a federal due 
process right to counsel for indigent parents in proceedings to involuntarily terminate 
parental rights, most states guarantee such counsel.  See Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 
2.10[2].  Despite the general guarantee of legal representation, the role of the attorney 
or guardian ad litem representing a minor parent charged with abuse or neglect re-
mains uncertain.  Professor Barbara Glesner Fines describes minor parents in the 
child welfare system as caught in a “netherworld between protected and prosecuted, 
between child and adult.”  Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 336.  Professor Glesner 
Fines discusses the various challenges of this kind of representation, including “the 
uncertainty of the client’s legal rights, the questions of the capacity of the child to 
direct representation, the role and influence of other parties in these disputes, and the 
systemic and personal biases present in representing teen parents.”  Id. at 322; see 
also Sankaran, A Hidden Crisis, supra note 356, at 38.  Numerous scholars have ar-
gued for client-directed representation for minor parents in involuntary termination or 
adoption relinquishment proceedings.  See Seymore, supra note 160, at 147–55 (argu-
ing that law should be reformed to require that minors relinquishing an infant for 
adoption have independent legal counsel who represents her expressed wishes, and 
that such counsel is preferable to appointment of guardian ad litem who makes his or 
her own decisions about best interests for the minor parent). 
 
Teen parents, even more than other children involved in the child welfare sys-
tem, need to have a voice in the process and to be spared the most negative 
psychological and legal consequences of a termination in which they were not 
empowered to make decisions about the representation.  When these same 
teenagers are the subjects of custody or adoption actions, courts consider their 
preferences, especially the choices of older teenagers. 
 
Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 327.  See also Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Law-
yers for Children: It is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 902–05 (2007) 
(child-centered standard used in placement for abuse and neglect cases and in custody 
litigation). 
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This question – what role should the third party adult play in the minor’s 
decision making – is a pitfall for any type of third party intervention.  If the 
law gives the third party adult decision-making power rather than limiting 
him or her to a counseling role, then minors could still be subjected to re-
strictions on their rights and shamed for their sexual behavior.  The aunt, 
counselor, or lawyer could arbitrarily obstruct access to abortion care or pres-
sure a minor to relinquish her infant for adoption as much as a parent or 
judge.  Furthermore, if reformed laws provided adolescents with a menu of 
options for adult guidance, it would be necessary to ensure that the state pro-
vided the resources to cover the costs of independent counselors and attor-
neys.  In child welfare law, a lack of sufficient resources to support teenage 
and adult parents remains an endemic problem within the system.  The re-
sources question makes it especially difficult to support options like mentor-
ing programs in the child welfare context. 
Despite the risks and costs of implementing policy reforms incorporat-
ing third party adults into laws governing pregnant and parenting minors, it is 
worth exploring these solutions in more detail.  The law already recognizes 
that in decisions related to sexuality and reproduction, parents may not be 
able to fulfill their commonly understood role of acting in their children’s 
best interests.363  Third party parental surrogates can serve as an alternative 
that accounts for the in-between state of adolescence in particularly sensitive 
contexts.  In addition, third party parental surrogates could better effectuate 
the stated goals of ensuring sound decision making and protecting children’s 
well-being in situations where parental or state intervention may not serve 
those goals. 
* * * 
The public and policy makers remain gripped by the intuition that many 
adolescents would benefit from adult guidance in making consequential deci-
sions.  The law reflects this intuition in practices that force parental or state 
oversight when minors choose abortion or parenthood.  Although some ado-
lescents can make decisions about abortion, parenting, and relinquishing their 
child for adoption without being required to consult an adult, legal reforms 
that incorporate third party adult involvement in these decisions could satisfy 
the perceived need for pregnant or parenting teens to receive adult support 
 
 363. Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 133 (“[A]dolescents 
may not want their parents involved in certain health care decisions, and, as a result, 
they will avoid seeking treatment if parental consent is required.  It is precisely this 
fear that gave rise to the ‘mature minor’ exception . . . .”); Scott, The Legal Construc-
tion of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 570 (“But should parents be legally excluded 
from their traditional role of making important decisions for their minor children?  In 
many regards, the arguments for allowing minors to consent to abortion without in-
volving their parents are similar to those made in support of minors’ consent statutes.  
Here, as in the context of treatment for sexually transmitted diseases or substance 
abuse, the interests of parents and children may conflict.”). 
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and would provide options other than parental or state authority.  Policy re-
forms that look to third party adults could help the law to explicitly 
acknowledge and make room for the unique needs of adolescents by address-
ing the absence of supportive parents and providing alternatives to overly 
restrictive state interventions that undermine minors’ reproductive rights. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Advancements in minors’ rights to autonomy in their reproductive deci-
sions remain illusory.  In its operation, the law takes a highly skeptical view 
of adolescents’ reproductive decision making, whether they choose abortion 
or childbirth.  As enforced by state officials, the law on adolescent reproduc-
tion serves as a means to punish teenage girls’ sexuality and impose tradi-
tional gender norms, rather than a means to the purported goals of sound ado-
lescent decision making and protecting children’s well-being. 
While recent scientific research suggests that teenagers differ in their deci-
sion-making abilities from adults, “research also indicates that, when guided 
by caring and competent adults, adolescents can make critical decisions for 
themselves and their children.”364  Within the context of sexuality and repro-
duction, those caring adults may not always be the adolescents’ parents.  In-
corporating third party adults into laws governing pregnant or parenting ado-
lescents offers much potential.  By considering options that reside between 
the extremes of complete autonomy or complete subjection to the authority of 
parent and state, we could create much needed space for adolescence in the 
law.  
 
 364. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 328. 
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